Sanguine, however, were the anticipations aroused by the great event of the day, to which, on its first announcement by Lord Raglan to the enemy, they refused their belief; and this not only at the seat of operations, where in many minds the wish might well be father to the thought, but even at home under the guidance of a comparatively enlightened public opinion. However this might be, preparation on either side was nevertheless not slackened, and the siege, which for a while seemed to keep even pace with tardy and fruitless negociations, ere long outstripped, and soon consigned them to oblivion.
Early in March the Russians, having seized on a mamelon, or hill in shape like a truncated cone, in advance and to the proper left of the Malakoff Tower, proceeded rapidly to entrench and arm it. This eminence, hitherto known by the English as Gordon's Hill, and when fortified named by the Russians the Kamschatka Redoubt, was destined to play an important fc
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'itntittm part in the subsequent operations of the siege, and was in fact long regarded both by assailants and defenders as the key of the position. So much progress had been made in this work by the 11th as to demand the most serious attention of the Allies, who at once determined to push with the greatest energy their joint attack in this direction. To this end the English the same night commenced the construction of a parallel to unite the right of our right attack with the left of the French on the Inkermann heights, and on the following evening our Allies began a corresponding parallel from their side in order to effect the contemplated junction. The rocky nature of the ground rendered it extremely difficult to obtain cover. Little advance, therefore, could be made during the day, and the process was necessarily a slow one; but on the 17th the communication was established between the French and English trenches. That night a severe and twice-renewed struggle occurred between the French and the Russians for the possession of some rifle-pits in front of the Mamelon, which greatly harassed the working parties of the former; but the result was unfavourable to the French, and the pits remained the next morning in possession of the enemy. These rifle-pits, which, with others constructed in advance of various portions of the defences, rendered the most essential service to the enemy by impeding our works, as well as by keeping down our artillery fire, are thus described by Mr. Eussell: —
" They are simple excavations in the ground, faced round with sand-bags, which are loopholed for rifles, and banked round with the earth which has been thrown up from the pit. Each of these pits contains about ten men. They are, in fact, little forts or redoubts for offensive proceedings against the besiegers, armed with rifles instead of cannon. Practice has made the men placed in them expert, and it is likely they are picked shots, for their fire is exceedingly good, and if a man shows for a moment above the works in front of these pits, he has a small swarm of leaden hornets buzzing round his ears."
Notwithstanding this check, the French still persevered in pushing towards the Mamelon, on which the Russians continued to labour in constructing a formidable work, which hourly advanced to its completion, in spite of the interruptions caused by a heavy artillery fire from the well-served batteries of the Allies. On the morning of the 22nd of March, the French once more renewed the struggle for the rifle-pits, and succeeded in driving the enemy out of those in their immediate front; but nothing further of importance occurred during the day. At night, however, the Russians, who could no longer view without uneasiness the Allies constantly gaining ground in the direction of the Mamelon, made a sortie of a more comprehensive character and on a grander scale than any on which they had hitherto ventured. Their
THE EAST.