Another reason urged Augustus of Saxony, the newly elected King of Poland, to curb the hated "imperialism" of Sweden. So unpopular was this German prince in his elective kingdom that he welcomed any opportunity for a foreign war which would turn the attention of his Slav subjects from internal affairs. Certain of victory in this enterprise he even took steps to reserve the honors of the promised campaign for the detested bodyguard of German troops who had accompanied him from Saxony. But the King of Poland and the Tsar were to learn that Charles of Sweden, in spite of his youth, was the first military genius of his age and that he commanded the most perfectly di'illed and disciplined army in the north.
In the course of a single brilliant campaign Charles drove the King of Poland from the province of Lithuania. The Russians who had meanwhile advanced towards the Baltic were th^o^vn into consternation by these events. At his leisure Charles now inflicted upon the Tsar's troops a great defeat at Narva. This victory, the more humiliating because even Peter's personal bravery was involved through stories of his cowardly conduct during the battle, also threatened the Russians' confidence in the value of the military reforms he had been at so much pains to introduce in place of their old drill and tactics. Meanwhile, isolated from his subjects by the intrigues of Piper (Charles' great foreign minister, whose diplomacy was almost as redoubtable as his master's sword) the King of Poland had become a dishonoured fugitive in his ovm dominions. The new candidate imposed upon the Poles in the person of Stanislaus LesczjTiski was but a docile representative of the real King — Charles of Sweden.
But the genius of Peter the Great never displayed itself so briUiantly as after these disasters. "The Swedes," he repeated again and again, "will soon teach us how to fight." Gathering a new army he attempted to intervene on behalf of the deposed Saxon elector Charles easily crushed their united efforts at Altranstadt (1706). Even the electoral dominions of Saxony were now threatened and Augustus, in order to save his German possessions, was obliged formally to renounce all pretensions to the throne of Poland. So threatening was the danger that he consented at the bidding of Charles to write a letter of congratulation to his successor, Lesczynski. Peter nevertheless resolved to continue the contest.
In the long struggle between Russia, Poland and Sweden that ensued, success almost invariably attended the armies of Charles XII. During this period the fortunes of Sweden were carried to their highest pinnacle. Historians now see that the "Mad King's" resolve to shatter the yoke of Moscovite influence in Poland by striking at the heart of Peter's vast empire, was more than a military adventure. The success of such a plan would have safeguarded the new Swedish possessions along the Baltic and established upon a lasting foundation his scheme, now all but realized, of making Sweden the supreme arbiter of the north.
But in the nine years which had elapsed since the battle of Narva, Charles had expended Sweden's hoarded treasure of men and money. Raw recruits now weakened the ranks of the veteran regiments he had inherited from his father. Youthful pride and obstinacy had induced him to discard the prudent ministers whose advice had been of such advantage in the earlier years of his reign. Charles might, with every advantage, have accorded the peace which the Tsar so earnestly desired in order to carry out his great plan of internal reform. He, nevertheless, continued active preparations for a new campaign.
With the approach of the invading Swedish armies twenty thousand Cossacks were summoned by Peter to join in the defense of the Ukraine. His emissaries found the Cossack settlements in a state of ahnost open rebellion. A tax of seventy kopecks (no small sum of money in that day) had recently been placed upon every Cossack, not excepting those who were performing military serv ice — an act bitterly resented as an infringement of the rights they had been assured at the time of their voluntary subjection to Russia. In Peter's plans for an accurate census of the Ukraine the Cossacks saw only a plan for fresh taxations and even more onerous terms of military service.