During the first siege of Azof, Peter the Great first learned from personal observation to appreciate the quahties and military capabilities of his new Cossack subjects. ^Vhen a serious check to the Russian forces occurred before that strong fortress in 1695, it was the mobility and resource of the Cossack levies under Mazeppa that covered the retreat of the famous "Xew Armies" organized by the Tsar on the European model. The Emperor or "Bombardier Peter," serving at the time in their ranks under the command of General Lefort, took part in all the hardships of this retreat. It was, however, through such defeats that every military advantage of Peter the Great was to be obtained. The faulty strategy which had failed to secure his object during these first operations was cast aside and Peter now conceived the idea of capturing Azof by a combined sea and land attack.
On the upper reaches of the river Don, the Tsar began at once to construct his armada, consisting of "twenty- two galleys, a hundred rafts and canoes"* The number of the latter craft indicates that the part played by the Cossacks and notably the Zaporogians in these first Russian naval operations must have been a considerable one. Relying on their skill as river boatmen and the tactics developed during many a raid against the Turks in the Black Sea, they were now launched in a sudden attack on the Turkish fleet. Less than 1500 Cossacks manning long river-boats, similar to those used by the Zaporogians, did not hesitate to attack the great Turkish galleys defending the communications by means of which the beleaguered fortress received its provisions from the Turkish colonies of Anatolia.
We can readily imagine with what enthusiasm and anxiety the Tsar followed the fortunes of the Cossack attack. Peter was himself in command of a small wooden frigate. He had now become "Steerman Peter Alexievitch," serving under the command of "Admiral" Lefort (for, together with the principal officers of his staff he had assumed naval titles and duties). Prodigies of valour were displayed in the hand to hand conflict which ensued. Little by little the surprising manoeuvres of the handy Cossack flotilla completely overcame the more regular naval strategy of the Turkish commander. The Ottoman fleet was gradually dispersed and the heavy galleys — separated from their fellows and rendered helpless — were cap-
* Rambaud, "Histoire de Russie," p. 363,
tured one by one. This wholly unexpected disaster cut off the Turks from their base of supphes and gave the garrison within the town no other alternative but to raise their turbans on the points of long lances in sign of surrender.
Fifteen hundred ducats were accepted (not, we are told without much grimibling) by the Cossacks instead of the promised right of sacking the town. Mazeppa and his Cossack boatmen were personally thanked by the Tsar — the latter in high good humor because he had himself been promoted to a superior grade by Lefort for the part he had played in the fight. It was thus as actual comrades in arms that the basis of the long friendship between the Emperor and Mazeppa was formed.
In 1705 Peter carried out his wholesale execution of the streltzi — the privileged but undependable mihtia of the old Russian court — a terrible requital for their disloyal beha\aour during his famous European tour. Following this event the Cossacks became a more important factor than ever in the border armies of Russia. At the same time, they received as recruits a great number of streltzi fleeinor from Peter's drastic military reforms. This new element was in all probability largely responsible for the revolt that spread among the Don Cossacks in the following year (1706).
The \ictories of Azof and the conquest of the shores of the Black Sea awakened the military ambitions of Tsar Peter. Moreover it was at this juncture that the King of Sweden died and his son Charles, a lad but 18 years of age, came to the throne. In the accession of so youthful a prince both the Tsar and the King of Poland saw an opportunity of ridding themselves of a rival power whose ambition clashed with their own. The position occupied by Sweden had long given her the control of the Balance of Power in the north. In every election for the Polish crown the King of Sweden had either sought the electoral honor for himself or had made his support essential in choosing the successful candidate.