1 854] REINFORCEMENTS NEEDED iii some time, till the 3rd Division, 2800 strong, came to our support; even then we did not muster 7000 men (against 50,000), and it was not till about half-past ten, or eleven, when the French came to our help, that the day began to turn in our favour. The enemy was then a few hours after completely routed. Lord Raglan is much pleased with our Brigade and speaks of them in the highest terms. They had to keep the right of our ground and hold the enemy in check until reinforcements came, and nobly thej'' did their duty. This movement of the enemy has, however, for a time checked the siege. We were to have stormed on Monday the 6th, but now that the Russians have got this addition to their strength, we must hold hard till we get reinforcements ourselves, the French expecting 20,000 more men in a short space of time. In the meanwhile our position is seriously altered, and instead of being for the offensive, we have to defend ourselves as well, and the latter is the most important. How the campaign will end I do not yet clearly see, but do not be disappointed if we do not take Sebastopol. Give my kindest love to both the dear boys, and tell them I hope they will always be good and never give their mother any trouble.... But mind, my darling, you do not spoil them by over-indulgence and a disinclination to punish them when you feel such a step to be necessary.... My health never was better. When you see William... tell him what I have told you, that he must not be too sanguine now as to the result of this campaign. We have already been too long about it. The place is stronger than people thought, and our army has proved much too small for so serious an undertaking. We want reinforcements of 15,000 men besides the French, and at once. — Ever, my dear sister, your affectionate brother,
Fredk. Stephenson.
To his Brother
Before Sebastopol, November 17, 1854.
My dear William, —... I am afraid the news you will now receive and have lately received will be rather disheartening to you all in England. The battle of Inkerman, glorious as it was, is a doubtful subject for rejoicing, inasmuch as the enemy attacked us in consequence of his having received powerful reinforcements, which will now enable him almost to turn the tables upon us and besiege us in his turn; in fact, since the battle our siege operations are certainly suspended until we in our turn get reinforcements (the French being daily in expectation of receiving from 1 5,000 to 20,000 men); but in this interval the enemy may receive a further addition to his strength, in which case it will go hard with us. Sebastopol never has been (and never can be without nearly double our strength) properly invested. One side of the harbour is as much as we can manage, and this line which the Allies occupy is at least 12 miles in extent, including the salient position of Balaclava, and this enormous extent of ground we have got to defend with at most 7000 men and carry on the siege at the same time. The consequence is that our troops are scattered very wide apart, too much so to render efficient support to each other at any point. The battle of Inkerman was a proof of this, for that part of our position was only defended by about 3000 men when first attacked by the enemy. It is true that other troops came to the rescue, but in such small numbers that at the end of three hours and a half fighting the English force had only risen up to 7000. The French then began to arrive and the day was ours, but that will show you what a ticklish position ours is. We do not care much for the Russians even with their present force; they had a lesson the other day that will tell upon them, but should they get a further increase of strength before the place falls I confess that I do not see how this campaign will end.
1854] LOSS OF TRANSPORTS 113