to the chief command in Egypt, for I naturally felt it very keenly, do so still, and probably ever shall, but I was anxious not to express myself upon the subject more than I could possibly help, but to keep my temper, submit, and put the best face on the matter I could. If I were to make any complaint it would be upon the grounds that I was sent out here at all. You recollect the circumstances, how anxious I was, for various reasons, — expense and family matters, etc., — to avoid taking up the appointment, which was literally foreced upon me. Under these circumstances it was to be presumed that I was, at all events, considered fit for any duty that might attach to this command, if not, nothing can justify the selection. But since I have been out here I have received repeated expressions of praise for the manner in which the duty has been carried on, far in excess of what I honestly think I have deserved. No later than August 5th, H.R.H.," having heard a false report that I had been unwell, writes: " I hope you will take great care of yourself, for your health and strength are invaluable to us. Everybody coming home is full of your praises (underlined) and the admirable manner in which," etc. etc. Later he writes: " I am glad to think that the whole conduct of this difficult operation is intended to be carried out under your direction." The preparations for any eventuality that might occur in the shape of an expedition, which we knew would be decided upon at the last moment, when great pressure would arise, were being energetically carried on, and very hard work it was, the difficulties being increased by obstructions, hints, queries, and general interference in the matter of detail on the part of the War Office. These remarks don't apply to H.R.H., who has never interfered with me, but has confined himself to a few broad principles of a practical character to be acted on or not as I thought best. Under these circumstances the unexpected announcement that Wolseley was coming out, not merely to superintend the organising of the small boat scheme,
but to take the chief command altogether, organise the force, appoint the staff, which was to be specially left in my hands, and command the expedition, was very startling. Not only am I put aside by this arrangement, but Earle, who was specially appointed to command the expedition, has now been relegated to an inferior position, to which he submits, to his great credit, without a word of complaint. One word about the immediate cause or pretext for sending Wolseley out. The Upper Nile had been selected at home for the line of operations to Khartoum, and my opinion had been solicited as to the employment, for the purpose, of 400 boats containing 12 men each. I had already recommended the use of local craft as a means of transport, which has been already employed successfully in transporting to Dongola the first instalment of men, with their month's supply. After a careful study of the river, with its cataracts and other difficulties, and considering the risk and other objections in the way of working their boats with inexperienced soldiers, and after consultation with the naval authorities, who had been specially employed in surveying the Cataracts, I expressed my opinion that the employment of small boats under such circumstances was impracticable. This remark did not apply to the Nile as a line of operation, but merely to the employment of those boats to be worked by soldiers. Lord Hartington then telegraphs that, after careful consideration of the whole question, H.M.'s Government are of opinion that it would be unfair to throw upon me the responsibility of carrying out a scheme which did not meet with my approval, a degree of susceptibility for my feelings which was certainly not manifested when I was originally appointed to this command. This was, I think, rather an unworthy suggestion, for it implied in reality that they mistrusted my sense of duty in carrying out to the best of my abilities any instructions of theirs, simply because I did not approve of them. I have given you a rough outline of the state of the case. If
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