MediaArhiv

Part 12

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and forming a most picturesque group. We left Tai-lien Bay on the 26th of July, the French leaving Chefoo on the same day, and the two fleets, about 250 sail, rendezvoused about 20 miles off the Pei-ho forts on the 28th. On the ist of August 5000 French and English landed at this place, whence we proceed with our whole forces, which are now disembarked, to attack the Pei-ho forts the day after to-morrow, the nth. Our landing here was unopposed, although two forts mounting 24 guns command the entrance to the river; but they were unoccupied, and with the exception of about 50 or 60 Tartar cavalry, who were watching our movements, we saw no enemy at all. We had to disembark in the water and wade through three-quarters of a mile of mud before we got to terra firma. The force bivouacked on a raised road running from Peh-tang to the Pei-ho across a flat, swampy country. This was the only safe, dry ground we could find, as we were afraid of quitting the road for fear the tide should come in at night. We intended attacking the forts early next morning, not knowing they were abandoned; this we ascertained, however, during the night, and so it ended in our taking peaceable possession of the town. This town contains about 20,000 inhabitants, and is built entirely of mud; the streets are full of it, and mud surrounds the whole place. I never saw such a wretched place in my life. But with all this drawback the troops are in wonderful health. The force opposed to us is chieflj'' Tartar cavalry, and the country between us and the Pei-ho seems literally studded with forts. The Chinese force, however, is reckoned rather low, only 15,000 I am told, and the Emperor, they say, is hardly able to pay them; but I do not quite believe this, and think we shall \Jind\ a much larger force opposed to us. We made a reconnaissance the other day to see what the road was like, and had a little skirmish with the enemy. They behaved very well and moved very steadily, and I trust that in a day or two we may be more intimately acquainted. August 10. — The rain, which fell heavily all yester-

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day, is beginning again this morning, and will in all probability have rendered this muddy country so swampy and impassable for our artillery as to necessitate postponing our march until the 12th or perhaps the 13th, for the General will not move on a Sunday if he can help it. Lord Elgin is with us, living on board ship in the river, and the other day he received an overture from the Viceroy of the Province to the effect that if he would keep his troops quiet, he, the Viceroy, would on his part give orders to restrain the impetuosity of the Chinese troops, and would endeavour to keep back those greedy of honour from rushing forward to the fight. Lord Elgin referred him to the terms of Mr. Bruce 's ultimatum, and told him that until those were agreed to, he could not stop his military preparations.... You must not be surprised if you receive no letter from me next time.... — Ever your affectionate son,

Fredk. Stephenson.

To his Brother

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My dear William, — You will have heard by telegraph long before this reaches you of our success: the Taku forts have all fallen, and all the fortifications on the Pei-ho, including Tien-tsin, are in our possession. Two regiments moved up there to-day, and the remainder of the army will follow as soon as possible. You will, I hope, be all pleased in England at the result of our operations. Sir Hope Grant has come out uncommonly well, and has shown in the plan of his campaign great firmness and steadiness of purpose, and great self-reliance. He resolved to attack upon the north side, which was undoubtedly the right course, as events have proved, but the French General objected to this and sent in an official protest against it, asserting that the south was the proper side to attack first. Although he sent men to take part in the action he was not present himself, but remained in the rear

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