It has been generally assumed that the circumstances under which the French Empire had recently come into existence demanded that its chief should make war on somebody, in order to divert attention from the origin of his power, and to give employment to an army which might otherwise become dangerous. It may be readily granted that it was most expedient, both for him and his people, to make his influence immediately felt. But that, in allying himself with England on the Eastern question, he was seizing on an opportunity for war is only a surmise for which it would be difficult to adduce proof. It was inevitable that he should throw his weight into the question, and he could hardly hesitate in his choice of a side. It was scarcely possible for the champion of the Latin Church in the East, who had just stood forth in defence of its claim, to abet the Czar in his demand for the protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Moreover, Nicholas, in his arrogant way, had given just offence both to Louis Napoleon and the French people by refusing to address him, as all other reigning potentates did, as " Mon Frere ; " as if he, the choice of the French people, were not entitled to be admitted to the brotherhood of sovereigns ; which was one of those gratuitous and unprofitable affronts which wise men are careful not to offer. On the other hand, the advantage was obvious of arraying himself by the side of, instead of against, the great Sea-Power his neighbour ; while as for individual predilections he had acquired, in his long residence in England, a hearty esteem for our institutions and our people, and the
1 6 Result of sending Allied Fleets to the Bosp horns.
kindnesses which he had received as an exile were always cordially acknowledged by him as a sovereign. But the evidence points altogether to the view that at first his design in associating himself with England was, while gaining the benefit of the alliance, to make use of it for peace, and not for war. Martin, in his Life of the Prince Consort, says, " Amity with England, and a close political alliance, had been uniformly declared to be the Emperor's dearest wish." On ascending the throne he had said, " Certain persons say the Empire is only war. But I say the Empire is peace, for France desires it." At the time of the Vienna Note, the Prince Consort, discussing the parties to it, said, " Louis Napoleon wishes for peace, enjoyment, and cheap corn." On the 8th August 1853 the Queen's speech said, "The Emperor of the French has united with Her Majesty in earnest endeavours to reconcile differences the continuation of which would involve Europe in war." And after the fleets were in the Bosphorus, the Prince Consort wrote : " Louis Napoleon shows by far the greatest statesmanship, which is easier for the individual than the many; he is moderate, but firm ; gives way to us even when his plan is better than ours, and revels in the advantages he derives from the alliance with us." No conjectures can hold their ground against this testimony, and it may be taken for certain that the Emperor faithfully co-operated with our Government throughout in its endeavours to settle the quarrel by diplomatic pressure, backed by the display of force.
When, however, they took the last step of sending their
Russia chafes the Western Nations. 1 7