To the Emperor and his Minister, absorbed in contemplation of the excellences of their plan, and hoping to hear that it was in process of accomplishment,
* See inner map on Map 3 for Aloushta,
236 Displeasure of the Emperor.
this uncivil treatment of it caused something like consternation. The stout warrior at one end of the wire was arousing great perturbation and resentment in the Imperial theorist at the other. At first some angry messages were flashed to the Crimea — one from Vaillant to Niel, relating to the expedition to Kertch : " This news to-day is a great trouble. What ! generals and admirals, not one of them thought it his duty to consult the Government on an affair of this importance ! " Then the Emperor sent a rebuke to his unappreciative subordinate : " I have confidence in you," he said, " and I don't pretend to command the army from here " (" But you do ! " was probably Pelissier's comment) ; "however, I must tell you my opinion, and you ought to pay regard to it. A great effort must be made to beat the Russian army, in order to invest the place. To gain space and grass is not sufficient just now " (this in sarcastic reference to Pelissier's reasons for extending the army). " If you scatter your forces, instead of concentrating them, you will do nothing decisive, and will lose precious time. The Allies have 180,000 men in the Crimea. Anything may be attempted with such a force, but to manoeuvre is the right course, not to take the bull by the horns ; and the way to manoeuvre is to threaten the weak sides of the enemy. The weak side of the Russians seems to me to be their left wing. If you send 14,000 men to Kertch, you weaken yourself uselessly ; it is to avow that there is nothing serious to attempt, for one does not willingly weaken one's self on the eve of battle. Weigh all this carefully." But,
Course taken by Vaillant. 237
whether weighed or not, these arguments had not the slightest effect on the mind of this resolute, even refractory, man. It might be all very well for an Emperor to amuse himself with making plans ; it was for a general to conduct operations. Seeing all this, and knowing how indispensable was Pelissier, Vaillant took a very judicious course. He desired Niel to aim at moderating Pelissier's too strong style of expression The General was to be made to understand that the most complete .confidence was reposed in him, and to be adjured to assume that as a basis in everything he might write. Whether Niel ever found an opportunity of discharging this mission seems doubtful, for he is shortly afterwards found uttering a lamentable wail, in a letter to the Minister. "At yesterday's meeting," he says, " General Pelissier imposed silence on me with indescribable harshness, because I spoke of the dangers which characterise vigorous actions with large masses at great distances apart. We were in presence of English officers; I saw he was irritated, and I wished at any price to avoid a scene which would have rendered my relations with him impossible." No matter whose emissary he was, Niel must know his place. There was no doing anything with so intractable a chief; he had his own way, and the French Army had a commander.
Pelissier's two first steps towards the execution of his projects, namely, an attack on an important outwork and the expedition to Kertch, took place at the same date, the 22d May, when he had been six days in command. The first of these was caused by a new enter-
238 New Russian Work.