The army was now so close to the prime object of the enterprise that, by going about a mile and a half beyond the halting place, the towers and fortifications were seen at no great distance in the basin below. And it was during the halt here that the question arose whether the army should at once attack the north side of Sebastopol. It may be doubted whether it was ever
68 Question of attacking the North Side.
seriously considered. The harbour of Sebastopol is from 1000 to 1200 yards wide. On the north side, besides some storehouses and a factory, the only constructions were forts at the entrance ; others on the cliffs, looking on the sea outside ; and on the heights inland a large permanent work, known to us afterwards as " the Star Fort," which, supported by earthen works and batteries, recently thrown up on either flank, dominated all the ground within range of its guns. It was on the south side that the city stood, with its public buildings, the quarters of the garrison, the docks, and the arsenal. The harbour between these was filled with the ships of war, whose broadsides could, of course, be brought to bear on either side, but which were at first disposed with the object of resisting an attack on the northern bank, where they swept the ground over which an enemy would advance. It is asserted that on the 2ist, the day after the battle of the Alma, Sir Edmund Lyons, second in command of the fleet, urged Lord Raglan to follow up the success, and " try to take the northern forts by a coup de main" But, from what has just been said, this was manifestly not only a quite desperate but a fruitless enterprise, except on one condition, namely, that the Allied Fleet should take a principal part in the attack ; and it was only in such a case that the view of a naval commander need have been an element in he question. Had some of our ships engaged the forts, had the rest passed in and attacked the vessels of the enemy, while the Allied Army stood on the heights above ready to
Menschikoff bars the Harbour. 69
descend, it is conceivable that Sebastopol might have fallen in a storm of battle as tremendous as the world has ever witnessed. But those who assert that this opportunity continued to exist when the armies were on the Belbek (23d and 24th September) ignore the change which had taken place in the problem. Menschikoff, singularly inefficient as a tactician, seems to have possessed both sagacity and decision in other fields of the military art. Immediately on entering Sebastopol after his defeat, he perceived two measures to be necessary. The one was to keep open, by means of an army in the field, his communications with Russia, while leaving a sufficient garrison in Sebastopol ; the other was to bar the harbour against his enemies' fleet. Therefore, contrary to the advice of his admiral, he caused seven ships of war to be sunk across the entrance of the harbour, in line with the forts, on the night of the 22d. On the 23d our vessels in observation off the port perceived that this had been done, and it was reported to St Arnaud the same evening. Thus an attack would now be made under very different conditions, for the rest of the Russian Fleet, thus rendered secure against attack, could still bring an exterminating fire to bear on the north side. The proper person for Lord Raglan to consult on the subject (if it was any longer matter for consultation) was his chief engineer, Sir John Buryoyne, who always denied that the proposition was ever seriously entertained, or that Lord Raglan had ever discussed it with him. And in support of this it is to be remembered that, as has been already
70 Reasons against Attack on the North Side.