works which, to the great annoyance and injury of the Allies, they had pushed out beyond the general line of intrenchment. He had given a practical illustration of this view, on the 1st May, when he was still only the commander of the ist Corps in front of the town. Todleben had, on the 23d April, effected some large lodgments of rifle-pits between the town ravine and the next one on his right of it, and in the ensuing week, employing a great number of labourers, and a strong force to protect them, had formed these into an important work, closed and partially armed, and so close to the French trenches and so menacing to them, by stretching towards their flanks, that it would have immediately become a most serious addition to the difficulties of the siege. Pelissier so strongly represented to Canrobert the necessity of driving the Russians out of it at all hazards that he was allowed to have his way. In two hand-to-hand encounters oT considerable forces on both sides, on the ist and 2d May, the French were so completely successful that they not only took the counterguard, but converted it into part of their own siege works, within 1 50 yards of the main line in front of it, with a loss to them of 600, to the Russians of 900 men.
In a letter to Bosquet, written immediately after he took command of the army, Pelissier discusses the alternative plans. The difficulties offered by the ground which the enemy's field army occupied, the want of information respecting its strength and positions, the danger of operating through long defiles with large forces,
234 He declares His Determination.
the perils of a retreat in case of failure, these and other reasons caused him to reject, or at least to postpone, the Emperor's scheme — "without regret," as he phrased it. "I am very determined," said this clear-seeing man, "not to fling myself into the unknown, to shun adventures, and to act only on sound knowledge, with all the enlightenment needful for the rational conduct of an army." He then announces his intention of extending the part of the army not engaged in the siege along the valley of the Tchernaya, so as to get air, water, elbow-room, and consequently health; and from thence to study the country for future operations, by reconnaissances, and force the enemy to spread themselves. " But," he adds, " all this is only the prelude to an operation much more important and more decisive in my eyes, the storming and occupation of the Mamelon and White Works. I do not disguise from myself that the conquest of these counter-approaches will cost us certain sacrifices ; but whatever they cost, Fmean to have them." Then, after detailing the features of his plan, he observes, " All this may be thorny, but it is possible, and I have irrevocably made up my mind to undertake it." Here, then, was a general who had occupied the firm ground of knowing what he meant to do, and setting about it with an unchangeable purpose. But he did not keep his opinions for his generals only. Niel noted the new commander's course with great disquietude, and even felt justified, in the strength of being the Emperor's emissary, to offer to his chief, in a note written in reply to a request for his view of affairs, a strong remonstrance.
Niel remonstrates in vain. 235