It has been said that another blot besides Balaklava existed in the Allied line of defence. In front of the Third, Fourth, and Light Divisions, encamped on the strips of plain lying between the several ravines, were the siege works, and a direct attack made on them would be so retarded that the Divisions could have combined to mdet it. But, in the space between the last ravine (the Careenage) and the edge of the Upland, the circumstances were different* A force might sally from the town, and ascending the ravine, or the adjacent slopes, without obstacle, would then be on fair fighting terms with whatever troops it might find there. Or the army outside, descending from the Inkerman heights, and crossing the valley by the bridge and causeway, would find itself on ground well adapted for traversing the space between the ravine and the cliff and entering the Upland at that corner. And the result of the establishment of the enemy's army there would be to open to it an advance which would cause all our Divisions engaged in the siege to form to meet it with their backs to the sea, and, in case of being overpowered, to fall back towards the French harbour (if they could), abandoning the siege works, with all their
* Map 5.
124 French Measures too exclusive.
material ; in fact, sustaining absolute defeat, possibly destruction.
The post-road going along the causeway, and ascending these slopes, reaches the Upland at a final crest, from whence it passes down and across the plain to join the Woronzoff road. It was on our side of the final ridge that the Second Division was encamped across the post-road. A mile behind it was the camp of the First Division. Then came a long interval of unoccupied ground, to the French camp on the south-eastern corner of the Upland, where Bosquet's covering corps may be said to have been employed in " gilding refined gold and painting the lily," by constructing lines of defence along the edge of cliffs, several hundred feet high, above an almost impassable part of the valley. Accepting the broad principle that a commander can only be expected to make good the deficiencies of an ally so far as may be without throwing a heavy strain upon his own troops, still, in this case, it was the common safety that was threatened, and it was a common duty to provide against the danger. By leaving a small force only in observation on the impregnable heights, and placing the main body near the really weak point, the labour and the forces of the French, superfluous where bestowed, might have rendered the position practically secure. Kinglake rightly characterises the disposition of Bosquet's corps as an example of the evils of a divided command.
The return of the First Division to its camp may have been unnoticed by the Russians, taking place as it
First Action of Inker man. 1 2 5