MediaArhiv

Part 10

page 119/136

the parapets ; the gunners lay dead in heaps on the batteries ; the wounded could not be removed by day, because the communications with the rear were now searched throughout by the fire of the Allies, and so lay where they fell, in torment, in the sun, beside the more fortunate .slain. On landing, the Prince had passed the hospitals, full to overflowing, and the ambulances with the wounded, crowding what had been the squares. There was nothing to relieve the horrible monotony of destruction and devastation, except the bridge, which promised retreat from this misery, and which was approaching completion.

Yet it was after this visit that the Russian General changed his mind in the direction of what he had before termed folly, " I am resolved," he wrote to the Minister for War, on the ist September, " to defend the south side to the last extremity, for it is the only honourable course which remains to us." Calculating that the daily loss of the garrison was from 800 to 900, and that he could bring 25,000 men from the Army outside to reinforce it, by leaving only 20,000 to guard the Mackenzie heights, he considered he might still prolong the defence for a month. Everything was against such a cruel determination ; but he proceeded to execute it so far as in him lay. It did not, however, rest with him to determine the end.

The cannonade once more reduced the Malakoff, its dependencies and neighbours, to absolute silence, and enabled the French to push their works yet closer. The soil between the Mamelon and Malakoff could be cut into like a cheese, and the trenches were more easily

276 French Plan of Assault.

made and better constructed here than elsewhere. The English trenches before the Redan had been stopped by solid rock ; the French approaches to the Little Redan, now only forty yards from it, had also got into soil so stony as would no longer afford cover. The most advanced approach to the Malakoff was only separated from it by twenty-five yards ; in the soft soil the trenches might have been pushed to the very edge of the ditch, but only with great loss, and, besides, the facility of mining below them would increase as the distance lessened. It was therefore deemed that the time for assault had come, and it only remained to determine the details. Accordingly, a council of war considered the matter. After the members had delivered their opinions, Pelissier expressed himself thus: "I, too, have my plan, but I will not breathe it to my pillow." There is, however, no need to be so reticent with the reader. The French commander had learned that the relief of the troops in the works before him took place at noon, and that in' order to avoid the great additional loss which would be caused by introducing the new garrisons before the old ones moved out, the contrary course was followed of marching out most of the occupants before replacing them. Thus noon was the time when the Malakoff would be found most destitute of defenders, and noon was to be the hour of the assault. Also another advantage was offered to the French. The salient of the Malakoff had been adapted to the form of the tower which it covered, and was therefore circular, consequently there was a space in it which could not be

The Final Bombardment. 277