All through July the defenders of Sebastopol beheld the works of the besiegers creeping steadily on ; and while the ordinary fire caused them a daily loss of 250 men, they knew that the interval must be short before they would again have to pass through the terrific ordeal of another cannonade, with the now ascertained result of seeing their artillery silenced, and dreadful losses inflicted on the garrison. At the burial truce, which followed the i8th June, a young Russian officer said to one of our staff,* who had been speaking of the losses of the Allies, " with great bitterness of manner and voice choked with emotion : ' Losses ! you don't know what the word means ; you should see our batteries ; the dead lie there in heaps and heaps. Troops cannot live under such a fire of hell as you poured upon us.' " In that bombardment the Russians had lost from 1000 to 1500 a day, and a renewal of the terrible time was now approaching. Supposing, then, that the thought of * The author of Letters from Headquarters ^ also quoted on p. 265,
268 Russian Plans of Battle.
retreat to the north side could not yet be entertained, the question was urgent whether to persevere in the passive defence or to bring up their field army for a general attack upon the enemy. It seemed that the chief officers on the spot were alone competent to settle this, and Prince Gortschakoff was ordered, with the approval of the Czar, to convene them in a, council of war, which met on the pth of August. The majority pronounced in favour of taking the offensive, but as to the time and mode there was such a diversity of opinion as showed how little hopeful was the situation. Whether to fling the field army against the positions on the Tchernaya ; or to combine with an attack there a great sortie from Sebastopol ; or, as one or two desired, to evacuate the south side, and combine garrison and field army for a great battle ; or whether (as Todleben held) the field army should be brought to reinforce the garrison, and both hurled against the besiegers' lines ; also, whether certain reinforcements of militia should be waited for — all these found their advocates. What was decided on was to attack the Allies on the upper Tchernaya, that is to say, the French on the Fedioukine heights,* numbering 18,000 men, with forty-eight guns, and the Sardinians, who continued the line up the stream, also on a line of heights bordering it, and held a hill on the Russian side of the river near Tchorgoun as an outpost, and who numbered 9000, with thirty-six guns; while close enough to act as a reserve were 10,000 Turks, in the valley behind. In addition to these, the French
* Map 3. See also page ii§.
Russian A dvance for Battle. 269
could readily bring down from the Upland a disposable force which would raise the whole Allied Army in this locality to 60,000. Besides the obstacle of the Tchernaya, there was a watercourse along the front of the Allies, who had further protected their lines and batteries by intrenchments.
On the afternoon of the I5th August the Russians brought their troops from the Belbek to join those on the Mackenzie Farm heights. During the following night, the right wing, 13,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and sixty-two guns, under General Read, moved down the high road of the Traktir Bridge, and halted opposite the French. The left wing, 16,000 infantry, seventy guns, under General Liprandi, moved in two columns ; the right one, under that general, followed the march of Read ; the left, under General Bellegarde, descending the heights by another path, was to halt on the road to Tchorgoun. The reserve of infantry, 19,000, with thirtysix guns, was to descend by both roads, and draw up behind Read ; the great body of cavalry, 8000, with twenty-eight guns, was to follow Bellegarde ; the reserve artillery, seventy-six guns, to draw up behind the infantry reserve.