said, the shore north of Sebastopol offered landing-places but no harbours. The only point it afforded for the disembarkation of supplies was the mouth of the Katcha, open to every wind, and the communications with which would have been liable to be intercepted at any time by a Russian army in the field. Finally, supposing all the success possible to be achieved, the Allies in possession of the north side, and the ships in the harbour by some miracle got rid of, it may be asked— what next ? How were we to compel the surrender of the south side by means of our field-artillery, across an interval of 1200 yards, against an enemy who, besides the artillery in his great stone forts, could from an inexhaustible arsenal line the whole southern shore, as well as the Inkerman heights on our left flank, with heavy guns ? It may safely be said that, after driving the enemy off the north side, we should have found ourselves in a position of greatly augmented difficulty.
It would not have been necessary to dwell upon this but or the support afforded to the theory which Todleben, the engineer who became so famous for his defence of Sebastopol, has set forth in his ample, and in most respects excellent, account of the siege. Unfortunately, not only his opinions but his facts are frequently more than questionable, and he gives but too much reason to infer that he exaggerated the insufficiency of the means of resistance in order to exalt the importance of his own splendid services in enabling the garrison to make so memorable a defence.
For example, he desires to show that the Allies, upon
Todleberis Strange Contention. 71
reaching the Belbek, ought to have made an assault on the north side. On the highest part of the ground there was the Star Fort, with the trenches and batteries in extension of it. To carry this by assault Todleben represents as an easy matter. This fort was a permanent work of 700 yards extent round the lines of fire ; it had escarps of masonry, and a glacis, and was surrounded by a ditch twelve feet deep and eighteen feet wide. It was armed with fortyseven guns. The ground over which the assailants must have advanced was swept by the broadsides of the ships below. Is it possible that an engineer could have looked on such a scheme as practicable ? But he says the enemies' ships, approaching the shore, could batter the fort almost with impunity. The impossibility of this is best shown by the fact that, in the subsequent engagement between the fleets and forts, one of the batteries on the cliffs (100 feet high) of the north side disabled several of our ships without receiving a shot in return, although they made it the object of their fire, and that the Star Fort is distant inland from this battery 1000 yards. Thus, according to Todleben, the ships, while themselves under the fire of the coast batteries, which they could not injure in return, were to bombard a fort a thousand yards beyond these batteries, and which would be invisible from the sea.
The second alternative suggested by Todleben is that the Allies should have established a force on the road to Bakshisarai, thus intercepting the communications between Russia and Sebastopol, which would, he says, have brought the campaign to an end. Now the
72 Impolicy of moving Allies Inland.