The Emperor, clinging as was his wont persistently to his idea, did not on account of this success cease to harp on the one string of his plan for operating against the field army. It was not till seven days after the action that he telegraphed to Pelissier saying that, before congratulating him on his success, he had wished to know the cost. " I admire the courage of the troops," he continued, " but I wish you to observe that a general action, which would hav'e decided the fate of the Crimea, would have cost no more. I persist, then, in ordering you to make every effort to take the field." In reply, Pelissier reaffirmed his conviction that his^course was the right one. " In this situation the complete execution of your orders is impossible. It is to place me, Sire, between insubordination and discredit.. The army is full of confidence and ardour; mine equals my devotion; but I pray your Majesty either to free me from the straitened limits imposed on me, or to permit me to resign a command impossible to exercise, in concert with my loyal allies, at the end, sometimes paralysing, of an electric wire." And to Marshal JVaillant he wrote: " The silence of the Government and the Emperor respecting me, and, above all, respecting my troops, and their brilliant feat of arms
Error of Pelissier. 255
of the 7th, has surprised and afflicted me. The telegraphic despatches received since have still more painfully impressed me." And, finally, on the night of the i /th: "I have waited all day for an answer to my important despatch of yesterday, but have received none, and the combinations settled with our allies are taking their course. To-morrow, at daybreak, in concert with the English, I attack the Redan, the Malakoff, and their dependent batteries. I have firm hope."
Up to this time Pelissier has appeared as a commander not only singularly resolute, but singularly clear of view. But now, with the great attack of the 1 8th pending, he committed two acts, not of resolution, but of waywardness, and in which his accustomed clearness of view showed itself to be suddenly obscured. He was already displeased by a difference of opinion between himself and Bosquet (who wished to postpone the assault until the progress of the works should leave less of open ground to be traversed under fire by the assailants), when that general gave new cause of offence. A plan of the Malakoff had been found on the body of a Russian officer, and brought to Bosquet, who had omitted to forward it to the General-in-Chief. Hearing of this, Pelissier, not content with demanding it with violent reproaches, removed Bosquet from the command of the forces with which the fresh attack was to .be made, sending him to the corps on the Tchernaya, and replaced this experienced commander, so well acquainted with the ground, by another just come from France, and knowing nothing of the local features and circumstances.
This was a very grave error, impossible to justify. Niel wrote to Vaillant about it : " Canrobert says it is not an eagle, but a vulture which he has put in his place, and that he regrets what he did. It is impossible to describe the wrath of Bosquet ; the proceedings of which he is the object are incredible." The general who replaced him, Regnaud de St Jean d'Angely, Commander of the Imperial Guard, had just thirty-six hours in which to study the very difficult ground and the siege works, and to place himself in relations with troops who did not know him, and who regretted their old chief.