The other error was even worse. Pelissier had arranged with Lord Raglan that the cannonade of the i;th should be renewed at dawn on the i8th, and should last for two hours, in which time it was calculated the enemy's guns might be silenced, and their works, after the repairs of the night, once more ruined. The attack was therefore to take place at five, or half-past. On the I7th, the batteries opening over the entire front from Quarantine Bay to Careening Bay, produced their effect as before. Evening saw the Barrack Batteries, the Redan, and Malakoff, with their dependencies, and the works thence to the harbour, all disabled, with vast losses within them of killed and wounded. But suddenly, without a word to Lord Raglan, Pelissier changed the plan. He resolved to dispense with the preliminary cannonade next morning, and to assault at daybreak. He communicated this change to his colleague in a despatch as definitive, and resting on grounds that could not be disputed. Lord Raglan heard of it with deep concern, but concluded
His Insufficient Reason. 257
that it was better silently to accept and conform to the change than to protest. Nevertheless, considering the issues involved, it is a question whether he would not have done well in declining to co-operate, except on the jointly arranged plan. The change was lamented by the English artillery officers, who had been very confident of rendering the Russian batteries nearly harmless in a very few hours.
These aberrations of Pelissier have never been quite accounted for. Kinglake suggests that they were due to the extreme anguish of mind inflicted by the Emperor's telegrams, and even states the time during which the perturbation lasted as eight days. In his despatch to Lord Raglan, Pelissier gave as his reason for hastening the hour of attack that the assembly of his troops in the trenches, as had been found on trial, could not after daylight be concealed from the enemy, who would therefore be' prepared to meet them. But the cannonade would have already prepared them ; moreover, the hour before dawn is that in which all menaced garrisons specially expect attack. Therefore nothing was so essential to success as to stop the fire which would bear on his troops in the open ground, and Pelissier's reason was not such as ought for a moment to have swayed him.
Before dawn, on the i8th, Lord Raglan and his staff assembled in an advanced trench which seemed suitable for observation, and would have been so, had it not been the focus of fire from the Redan and Malakoff. From thence could be seen our troops, detailed for the assault, and their supports, crowding the
258 Failure at the Malakoff.
advanced trenches ; and the movements around the Malakoff were, with daylight, also discernible. The day had been chosen as one on which the memory of Waterloo might happily give place to a joint victory of French and English. Instead of this, it was marked from the outset by a series of blunders and misfortunes.
First, the French troops, destined to form the right column against the Malakoff, found, on reaching the trenches in the night, that the post they were to take up was still occupied by another part of the attacking force. Much delay and confusion was thus caused, and under the brilliant starlight, the enemy, already roused to more than common vigilance, perceived the preparations for attack. At two in the morning his bugles sounded the alarm ; the reserves closed up to their posts, the embrasures were opened for action, and fieldguns were placed in the Malakoff and elsewhere to fire on the columns of assault. Next, the French general who was to direct the assault against the left of the Russian line mistook a casual shell for the signal of attack, and advanced prematurely. But it is not likely that these mischances greatly affected the result. The repairs and renewals, which by the extraordinary energy of the garrison and its leaders had been accomplished in the few hours of darkness, enabled them to pour such a storm of shot from every part assailed that no serious impression was made anywhere. Under the overwhelming fire from the ramparts, the spaces of open ground to be traversed by the assailants were thickly
Failure at the Redan. 259