In prosecuting the Siege. 263
spirit, or rendered him more conciliatory ; and when, in compliance with a hint from Vaillant that the Emperor complained of the small attention paid to the Imperial views and messages, Pelissier wrote to Louis Napoleon, he set forth his conception of the situation no less clearly and decisively than before, and weighed the Emperor's plan against his own without any sign of giving way. "We must look even more carefully to the chances of a reverse than to those of a victory. Before the fortress our failures do not change the situation ; they leave us to-day where we were yesterday ; but in a battle in the field the losses and disorders will be multiplied in proportion to the distance from our base." He then discusses the problem in a very masterly way, and winds up thus : " I am too devoted to my country, too anxious to serve the Emperor according to his views, to be suspected of being governed by obstinacy ; it is simply sincerity and devotion which actuate me .... Believe that if I do not enter into the projects which have your sympathies, Sire, it is because I should risk the fortunes of your Majesty, which are the fortunes of France." Probably it will be thought that Pelissier gave no greater proof of the firmness of his character than when he thus adhered to the much-questioned plan, in executing which he had just sustained a heavy defeat. The letter made a strong impression on the Emperor. He had been with difficulty dissuaded from displacing Pelissier and giving Niel the command. But he now showed this letter to Vaillant as no less remarkable for its substance than its form. And
264 Vaillant sides with Pelissier.
Marshal Vaillant himself plays a very fine part in the correspondence. He gives excellent counsels, admirably and often wittily expressed, to the Emperor, to Pelissier, and to Niel. He admonishes Niel to conciliate Pe"lissier ; he advises Pelissier to trust Niel. And now he declared for Pelissier's plan. "There can be no question of field operations now," he writes to Pelissier; " that would be to abandon the certain, which, I allow, is not brilliant, for the uncertain, which may be disastrous. It is the fortune of France which is played for before Sebastopol. At least, let it be well played for, .... I have often told the Emperor that the time for diversions is past ; that we grasp the fortress too closely to distract ourselves with exterior operations, in which a check might have terrible consequences." And to Niel he says : " To undertake a campaign with the cholera for company, and a great siege at our back, would terrify me ; I could understand it in May ; in July it is no longer possible." So the siege went on,; only Pelissier practically confessed his mistake by now resolving to push his approaches (as he had phrased it in his letter to the Emperor), " as methodically, as prudently, and as closely as possible."
There can be little doubt that the event of the iSth June pressed heavily on Lord Raglan. He had never appeared to be a commander who took his responsibilities anxiously ; indeed, to some observers, it seemed that they scarcely impressed him in due proportion to their gravity. But the suppression of feeling may itself have been costly. Five days after the failure of the assault,
Death of L ord Raglan. 265