The menace of an attack by Gortschakoff on the heights held by Bosquet had not been without its effect. For an hour, while the real fight was taking place at Inkerman, the French troops were kept in their lines. At the end of that time Bosquet sent two battalions from Bourbaki's Brigade, and two troops of horseartillery, to the windmill on the road near the Guards' camp, and accompanied them himself. He was there met by Generals Brown and Cathcart, to whom he offered the aid of these troops, and expressed his readiness in case of need to bring up others. The generals took the strange, almost unaccountable, course of telling him that his support was not needed, and asking him to send his battalions to watch the ground on the right of the Guards' camp left vacant by the withdrawal of the Guards to take part in the battle. Bosquet had thereupon returned to his own command ; but receiving fresh and pressing communication from Lord Raglan
154 Crisis before the French arrived.
he had directed the troops already despatched again to march on Inkerman. Thus it was not till the battle had been going on for between two and three hours that Bourbaki's two battalions, numbering 1600 men, arrived near the crest, when they were posted for some time in rear of it, the 6th of the Line on the right of the Fore Ridge, the ^th Leger near the post-road, and it was at these points that they first entered the fight.
The next French reinforcements, consisting of four companies of chasseurs, and part of D'Autemarre's Brigade, 1900 men, arrived with Bosquet himself about ten o'clock, closely followed by the rest of the brigade, numbering 2300 more, with two other batteries of fieldartillery ; and more than half of these troops took an important part in the engagement. Finally, the French reserve, of 2400 men came on the field at eleven o'clock, when the attacks of the Russian infantry had come to an end.
An officer so experienced in war as Bosquet must have frequently considered what part, he should take in defending Mount Inkerman against a pronounced attack while he should himself be threatened from the valley. Seeing how closely his own fate was bound up in that of the British troops in that quarter, he cannot be said to have rightly appreciated the problem. The view he took of it was much too exclusively a French view. According to all reasonable calculation, he would have found 20,000 Russians, followed by 15,000 more, with an immense force of artillery, advancing on his left rear
Gortschakoff's Part. 155
long before he had moved a man to support us. In that case, to have continued to watch Gortschakoff would only have insured his own ruin. The most tremendous risk was incurred, by French as well as English, first when he placed all his troops so far from the point of danger, and next when he so long delayed to move sufficient forces thither ; and not even his own manifestation of goodwill, and the strange reception given to his battalions by Generals Brown and Cathcart, can altogether exonerate him. That he at last felt himself free to lend effectual aid (and that it was effectual was owing to circumstances beyond calculation) was due to his perception of the fact that Gortschakoff's advance and cannonade was a transparent feint. A commander can hardly be set on a more difficult task than to execute a feigned attack in open ground against a commanding position. All the Russian movements in the valley were as clear to view from the plateau as if performed on a map. Either Gortschakoff's share of the action fell short of the orders given to him, or those orders ought to have directed him to make a real attack. About this Mr Kinglake says : " With respect to Gortschakoff's instructions, the general order was worded as though it meant to direct against Bosquet's position an actual, unfeigned attack ; but on authority which I regard as indisputable, I have satisfied myself that the orders really given to Gortschakoff were of the kind stated in the text," that is, he was " to menace Bosquet by feints." In actually assaulting the heights he would no doubt have lost many men ; but they would have been the price of that