march, and that, with the defeat of the defensive army, the place would not long resist the means of attack which would be brought to bear on it. There was no thought of a protracted siege; a IqudJngi a march , a battle, and, after some delay for a preliminary bombardment, an assault, were all that made part of the programme.
These anticipations were by no means so ill-founded as, after the many contradictions by the event, they were judged to have been. It was unlikely that a large Russian army should be permanently kept in a spot not easy of approach by land, and where its supply would be difficult, at a time when Sebastopol was not imminently threatened ; and, since the sudden cessation of operations on the Danube, there had been little time for preparation against so formidable an attack as was now impending. The command of the sea conferred on the assailants inestimable advantages, and there was very fair reason to expect that, long before Russia could bring her huge numbers to bear, the conflict would be decided in closed lists by the armies which should at first enter them. In any case, it would have been very difficult to point to any more vulnerable spot on Russian territory.
It must not, however, be thought that no siege of Sebastopol was contemplated. Immediately after the Russians had retreated from the Danube, the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary for War, wrote thus to the Commander of the British Forces, on the 29th June 1854:—
26 Instructions to the British Commander.
" I have to instruct your Lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless, with the information in your possession, but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. The confidence with which Her Majesty placed under your command the gallant army now in Turkey is unabated, and if, upon mature reflection, you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this undertaking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though Her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack from which such important consequences are anticipated must be any longer delayed.
"The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay; and as there is no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is adduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is, on all accounts, most important that nothing but insuperable impediments, such as the want of ample preparations by either army, or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it, should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.
" It is probable that a large part of the Russian army now retreating from the Turkish territory may be poured into the Crimea to reinforce Sebastopol. If orders to
A Siege contemplated. , 2 7
this effect have not already been given, it is further probable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the Allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. Agnail communications byjsea are now in the hands of the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance to endeavour to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions."
This despatch had been preceded by a private letter containing this passage : —
" The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, unless you and Marshal St Arnaud feel that you are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay siege to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever convinced that, without the reduction of this fortress, and the capture of the Russian fleet, it will be impossible to conclude an honourable and safe peace. The Emperor of the^ French has expressed his entire concurrence in this opinion, and, I believe, has written privately to the Marshal to that effect."
A siege^then, \vasin the programme, but it is certain that even a probability that it would last through the winter would have put an end to the project.