Gortschakoff's plan was this : at daybreak, Liprandi was to drive in the Sardinian outposts on the right bank of the stream, while the whole Army formed to attack. GortschakofT would then determine whether to use his whole force for the attack of the Sardinian position, or for that of the French, and, till he had determined, all were to await orders. The first step in the programme
270 Battle of the Tchernaya.
was accomplished by driving the Sardinian outposts as far as the last height on the right bank, which they continued to hold. But here a terrible disappointment* according to his own report, awaited Gortschakoff. General Read, apparently interpreting an order sent to him " to commence " as meaning " to attack," launched both his Divisions, prematurely and without a preliminary cannonade, at the heights held by the French. He carried the tete de pent with the Division on his left, the Twelfth, and ascending by the road, it reached the French lines. But it got no farther. Crushed by a tremendous fire, it was driven down the hill, and across the stream, with immense slaughter. Read's other Division, the Seventh, crossing by fords, endeavoured to move along between the front of the French and the river, in order to attack their left flank, but was soon compelled, after a feeble attempt, to regain its own bank in disorder, and though suffering a comparatively slight loss, was not again brought into action. The Twelfth Division, reformed after its repulse, was now used as a support to the Fifth of the Reserve in again attacking the French right ; they again took the tete de pont, and advanced by the road and neighbouring fords across the stream and up the heights, but only to be again driven back to their own bank ravaged as before, and with the loss of General Read, who was killed. Thereupon the Twelfth and Fifth Divisions, reduced to half their numbers, were withdrawn to ground near the bases of the Mackenzie heights, and Liprandi was ordered to send a brigade of the Seventeenth Division to the assault. It ascended
Retreat of the Russians. 2 7 1
at the same points as its predecessors, and like them, after reaching the French lines, and undergoing heavy loss, was driven back to the other baqk, its retreat being covered by another of Liprandi's regiments.
Gortschakoff, seeing that the French were being strongly reinforced (a French Division having reached the ground, and two others being on the march for it, while six battalions of Turks had come up), withdrew his troops. His cavalry and guns formed line across the valley, the infantry in rear ; and thus for many hours he waited, beyond cannon shot, in case the Allies should quit their positions to attack him. But this formed no part of Pelissier's design. The Russians, whose disaster was aggravated by want of water, withdrew, and about two P.M. were seen ascending the road to the Mackenzie heights, while other columns followed the route thither from Tchorgoun, till the whole had quitted the field. The slaughter among them had been very great. Three generals, sixty-six other officers, and 2300 men were killed ; 160 officers and 4000 men wounded, and thirty-one officers and 1700 men had disappeared. The French lost 1500 killed and wounded; the Sardinians, 200.
With this defeat vanished whatever faint hope the Russian chiefs might have had of retrieving, in any important degree, their failing fortunes. The employment of militia in this battle showed the approaching exhaustion of their resources. In May 1855 Lord Lansdowne stated in the House of Lords, as derived from authentic sources, that a return was made up a few days before
272 Russian Losses in the War.