sion rested its right on the ravine descending to the Careenage Creek ; on the other side of which, near the eastern edge of the Upland, was posted the second Division, looking towards the heights of Inkerman, and some hundred yards in rear of it the First Division was encamped, its right also near the edge of the Upland ; and both these were available for mutual co-operation with Bosquet, while, unlike his force, they sent their quota of men to the trenches.
Bosquet set about fortifying the edge of the heights on which he stood ; * and, so far as the position on the Upland was concerned, the armies there were for the present (that is to say, while their force held its present relation to that of the garrison of Sebastopol and MenschikofFs field army) sufficiently secure. But there were two vulnerable points in our line ; that with which we will first deal was caused by the need to cover Balaklava. About 4000 yards from that place a row of heights crossed the valley, low on the side of the Upland, but rising into higher and sharper hills towards the heights of Kamara. On these, slight works were constructed, armed with iron twelve-pounders, and garrisoned by Turks. The 93d Highlanders (left there by the First Division) were encamped between these heights and Balaklava ; a thousand marines were landed and placed on the hills to our right of the harbour, on the heights before which places were found for guns brought from the ships ; and in the valley below the cliffs of the Upland, and on the left front of the Highlanders, were the
84 Balaklava a Vulnerable Point.
camps of the two brigades of cavalry. A point of special importance was that the one metalled road, the Woronzoff road, which ascended the cliff of the Upland, and wended thence to the town of Sebastopol, lay, as it crossed the valley of Balaklava, between and along the hills occupied by the Turks. The road continued on to Yalta, the Woronzoff country house and estate on the south-eastern shore of the Crimea ; another branching from it crossed the Tchernaya, and went on up the Mackenzie heights to Bakshisarai. The Russians could approach Balaklava quite out of range of the guns and troops on the Chersonese ; thus the Allies must be drawn from their heights down to the valley in case of an advance of the enemy in that direction. Therefore, the valley of Balaklava was a vulnerable point, and, if possible, should have been made strong enough to secure the Woronzoff road throughout its extent from Balaklava to the plateau.
The Russians in Sebastopol now knew exactly what they had to face, and were at least delivered from the perplexities which had at first beset them.
The tidings of defeat on the Alma reached Sebastopol about ten or eleven at night on the 2Oth, when Menschikoff arrived in the fortress. The Prince gave orders to Admiral Korniloff to bar the entrance to the harbour by sinking some of the war-ships. Next morning the Admiral summoned his naval captains, and after telling them of Menschikoff's design, put it to them whether his own proposal would not be preferable, which was to put to sea and, by attacking the
Todleeris View of the Situation. 85
Allied Fleet and flotilla, deprive the enemy of their means of subsistence. The council did not concur with him, believing that the time for such an enterprise had gone by, and preferring to bar the harbour by sinking the ships. The same afternoon those which were to be sunk were moved into their places.
During the 2ist, MenschikofT's troops from the Alma, after reaching the north side, were transported across the harbour, in accordance with his determination to move his army into the open country, and bivouacked in a field outside the town.