across the post-road, and their left extending far beyond the Russian right, in that case, if the Russians had held their position, with a powerful attack prepared against their front, and a large force turning their right, a defeat would have been to them absolute destruction. If, seeing the manoeuvre, MenschikofF had marched out of the position, and formed across our left, backed on the Simpheropol road, he would have gained a tactical advantage largely compensating for his numerical inferiority, and great chances would have been afforded to an able tactician thus operating on a flank with his own retreat assured ; in fact, there would 'have been a large field open for skilful manoeuvres on both sides, and the Allies would at least have had the advantage of drawing him from his position, when they might well have hoped that, with ordinary equality of skill, they would have forced him back, and gained the road to Sebastopol. On the other hand, they had to consider whether they would run any serious risk in thus leaving a space between their right and the sea. Now a Russian force could only have operated there by traversing the plateau swept by the guns of the fleet, descending the difficult paths through the cliffs, crossing the stream, and forming for attack with its back to the sea, and with a retreat across the Alma and up the cliffs impossible, except in case of the most absolute defeat of the Allies. This, therefore, need not be taken into the account, and all considerations point to this suggested movement of the Allied Army away from the sea as the right one. The battle, as fought, showed a singular absence of
64 General Advance wanting in Ensemble.
skill on all sides. The Russian general showed great incompetency in leaving the issues of the cliffs unclosed, in keeping his reserves out of action, in withdrawing his artillery when it might have best served him, and in leaving absolutely unused his so greatly superior force of cavalry on ground very well adapted to its action. The part played by the French was not proportionate either to their force, or to their military repute. Of the two divisions brought at first on to the plateau, one brigade, that nearest the sea, together with all the Turks, never saw the enemy, and had no effect on the action ; and another division of the front line, with easier ground, only arrived very late to the support of the others. Though these others (three brigades) were opposed by no overwhelming force, they hung back, and never, up to the end of the battle, seriously engaged the Russians. No favourable impression was left on the minds of the English by their Allies' share in the action. The English divisional generals were, as we have seen, left to themselves, except for the order given to two of them to attack ; and it was inevitable, in their relative position to the French, that they should advance straight to their front. This they did, in the face of a formidable resistance, and with a gallantry to which their losses testify. But when it had become evident that no great operation against our flank was to be attempted, and that the enemy was altogether committed to a direct defence, our attack should have been so strong, so concerted, and so fed and maintained, as to bring our whole force to bear on the enemy. Thus,
The Cavalry. 65