of the Tchernaya. The remainder of the troops formed the ample garrison of the works of Sebastopol. Long before the November dawn of Sunday, the besiegers heard drowsily in their tents the bells of Sebastopol celebrating the arrival in the camp of the young Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas, and invoking the blessings of the Church on the impending attack, towards which the Russian troops were even then on the march.
CHAPTER VII.
BATTLE OF INKERMAN.
Rumours before the Battle — Description of the Ground — British Position — The Russian Plan of Battle — How carried out — Proximity of Corps to Battlefield— Soimonoff attacks — Effects of the Fog — Soimonoffs Right in Advance — The British repulse Him — Pauloff's Troops engage — Pauloff also repulsed— Causes of Russian Repulses — Dannenberg's Attacks — Greater Obstinacy of the Attack — Action and Death of Cathcart — The French drive back the Russians — Allies defeat another Resolute Attack — Allied Artillery begin to prevail — What delayed Bosquet — Crisis before the French arrived — Gortschakoffs part— Close of the Battle— Terrible Carnage— The Operations discussed — The Attack suitably met — The Sandbag Battery — Russian Exaggerations — What was at Stake — Consequence of Victory.
WHEN the Czar Nicholas received the news of the battle of the Alma, he was, Kinglake tells us, terribly agitated. A burst of rage was followed by a period of profound dejection, when for days he lay on his bed, taking no food, silent and unapproachable. But a speedy reaction must have followed when his military counsellors showed how hopeful was the situation. For his enemies were now definitely lodged in a small corner of the Crimea, and bound to it by their dependence on the fleet ; Sebastopol was amply garrisoned, and the fortifications daily grew stronger ; the field army assured the concentration of the troops which were
132 Rumours before the Battle.
crowding the roads of Southern Russia ; behind them the resources in men and material were almost boundless. Only there was this limitation, that a season was near when the march of troops towards and along the Crimea would be almost impossible. But there was ample time to do all that was needful to raise the Russian Forces to an overwhelming preponderance ; and their point of attack, offering at once the greatest advantages for entering on the battle, and the most complete results as the fruits of*victory, was so obvious that it might almost be fixed, and the details arranged, at St Petersburgh. Probably it was so arranged ; rumours began to pass through Europe of a great disaster impending over the invaders, and a paper was communicated to our Foreign Office, purporting to be a copy of a despatch from Menschikoff for transmission to the Czar, and believed to be authentic, which said, " Future times, I am confident, will preserve the remembrance of the exemplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of the Allies. When our beloved Grand Dukes shall be here, I shall be able to give up to them intact the precious deposit which the confidence of the Emperor has placed in my hands. Sebastopol remains ours." This confidence was amply justified by the situation. But while such were the views of the enemy, only a few in the Allied Armies foresaw this particular danger. Evans, whose apprehensions were intensified by his responsibility as commander of the troops on that part of the ground, had indeed for long felt uneasy at our want of protection there, and had even begun a line of
IV&Jter & Boiitall sc.
Description of the Ground. 135
intrenchment to cover his guns ; but it was not more than begun, and on the day of battle the ground was marked only by two small fragments of insignificant intrenchment, not a hundred yards long in all, and more like ordinary drains than fieldworks, one on each side of the road as it crossed the crest behind which the Second Division was encamped.