Drume, while supporting the idea of individual rights, refuse to draw the entire argument from metaphysical postulates. They do not consider the state as a “sacrifice of individual rights” but, in their judgments, do not for one minute depart from the point of view of the happiness or freedom of the individual as the basis of individual rights. To follow the writers of the first group is to return to the flow of theories of the 18th century.
On the Internet, they only adapt the political structure in general and in detail for large or small liver and individual rights, but in explaining these latter, we do not meet the original devil. Some of the writers of this direction categorically declare that there is and cannot be any other way to resolve the problem of political individualism, except for the one predetermined by Rashopalism, which they now give the form of metaphysical idealism, opposing positivism. This happens for the reasons, say, for example, Apri Michel, that, in political terms,
individualism, from a positive or metaphysical point of view, we ultimately reach unprovable anti-poems. All you have to do is choose. But sosholomya and positivism are anti-industrialistic. Therefore, the only thing to do is to dwell on metaphysical idealism.
But let’s try to look closely at both solutions to individual problems proposed by the dominant doctrine.
1) In a broad sense.
OJSC RI II PESO USAAOEINIAIAO © SIEYAITT IVO CH ii but,
I am right in using the ideological material we obtained, which reflected and explained reality and indicated the basis for the development of new normative understandings.
` Does individual right precede the state and set boundaries for it, that is, have a conditioning effect? On the contrary: does the state condition individual right by “granting or recognizing” it in the amount and degree at its discretion? Positive answers to these questions are mutually exclusive. This is the opinion of the modern prevailing doctrine of a metaphysical, racialistic or legal nature.
Isn't the methodological mistake of both views in the fact that they are both based on reinorutsfi. In fact: the first of them considers the right of the individual, the second the necessity of statehood as the starting points of their concepts. Both of them stop, in essence, at arbitrarily chosen moments, placing them as the basis for further constructions.
Law and the state, no matter how they are understood, are themselves derivative conditions of human existence, changing in their forms. This. It is better not to demand proof now. We owe it to historians of law and the entire cycle of positive science about people and societies. Therefore, to operate, at the present time, with only metaphysical concepts of law and state in space and time, does not this mean filling the doctrine, in the words of criticizing the Rashonalistic doctrine of the 18th century, with isolated members of the writings of Montesquieu Rousseau... Mably, Sayes, etc., combining from them original theories? Whereas a careful examination of the originals of these theories, in their clear sequence,
1) Expression Prof. Jellinek see Ge Eggtsie Cheg Mepzevep ipa Viatsegtestie. Gehry 1895 (sh pe). See also his Zuzesh Cheg zaB]esyuev bet step Vesce.
point out that philosophical ideas about law and states depended on those understandings, which, on the one hand, were reflections of life, with the other anticipating awareness of the further development of this life, which responded to human aspirations and ideals. These norms, if we reveal the legal and political terms in which they were expressed, are nothing more than bringing into human consciousness those or other desirable conditions of human life in society. The entire development of the direction of political individualism is nothing more than a consistent change in normative understandings that revealed the understanding that exists for the individual.
These clarified norms of understanding turn into norm definitions, embodied in conventional and, finally, torid norms.