And we think that this scholastic dispute about the nature of law or the state contains the essence of the question of so-called individual rights and is not accepted! I of one side or the other in this dispute can be found in the solution of the question, namely by clarifying the conditions of our existence and the existence of people, which, under more and more conditions, are outlined, thanks to accumulation of historical, positive knowledge. This positive sign, with its specific content, fills the most concepts with meaning, appearing with a schematic character. (This is for example, the concept of natural law. Having compared the understanding of this the term (Pro]esoshepa to Pe i BeSh ac ras15) in Hugo Grosch and in Spencer (“Justice”) can easily be seen to confirm what we have said). But. your demand for those or other conditions of existence is supported by knowledge of the laws the very existing person. This is probably possible for us in relative boundaries. The ideal requires absolute knowing everything especially where we are talking about goals in the field of volition - (which served as a logical impulse for the construction of G. Spencer, absolute ethics) * Therefore, in the field of studying ethics and law, we turn to hypotheses and our activity, as Guyot explained No.) must always contain an element of risk. Known in memory, to one degree or another of modality, (using Kapt’s expression), the laws of our existence are released before
We often fill ourselves with hypothetical establishments of life goals, regardless of whether we are pursuing their implementation now or in the distant future 2).
The named typothesis of values provides, in our opinion, a satisfactory explanation of the concept of the dignity of the human person, which we encountered among the Stoics, and in Christianity, etc.... and, finally, in the modern doctrine of individual rights 3)
The history of the political-individualist government suggests that the doctrine of political individualism was created through the gradual disclosure of life values that are most important for the social individual. In the end, this doctrine asserts that these values belong to a person regardless of the political environment and that the state is a means of protecting such values. The design of the state apparatus must be adapted precisely for this purpose. In this doctrine it is necessary to separate the truly explanatory elements of the real state of affairs from the doctrinaire straightforwardness and narrowness of the theories of its defenders. At the very end. Trying to justify, in the mines
1) M. Schual. Ez4i1zze @'ipe shoga]e zap o!oayop p! vapeyop. R. 1885 238-24.. Ge mzatse shebfarm!aie Chapz Gasjosh G. U. sei. AND.
2) Isn’t the meaning of the transition from the concept of existence clearly, in relation to the question under consideration, about the value of the following: I must mean I am obliged to act in accordance with the dignity of my personality. Otherwise I lose this dignity.
3) U Nashmyop, begreg, Vaga 616 tu, Eztet, Oapdo, Vogoeap@, etc. Finally, Jellinek. (Or. s.v. 75 i.) when this last understanding of the person makes the basis of the public legal claims of the citizen.