On what is D. S. Mill’s broader concept of personality based in comparison with Bentham’s? We will serve such people first of all from the point of view of the optics of pleasure and suffering. Purely animal feeling—=a personality trait—increased pleasures and decreased suffering, Mill finds a counterpoint in the preference of some pleasures over others in quality. Pleasures of good quality should be preferred by the individual to the lower ones. The first, to which Mill includes, for example, spiritual pleasures, are more worthy. They elevate their dignity is the value of the human personality. The contented attitude belongs to the mind of individuals capable of self-observation and Socratic self-knowledge, who are in favorable conditions of moral experience, but these people must comply with one more condition, which we will discuss below. Consequently, the individual’s mind considers some pleasures to be more consistent with the ideal of the development of human nature and therefore morally more true. No matter how hard Mill tries to find the empirical tenesis of the concept of the dignity and value of the human person, he cannot do without some idealistic theology. But when speaking about the valuation of pleasures, Mill does not mean only individual experience, but collective experience. According to Mill, the connecting element between individual and social interests is, on the one hand, rationally understood egoism, and on the other, a feeling of sympathy. Already Bentham, as we have seen, appealed to feelings of sympathy and goodwill. But Mill give it a methodical and concrete form. This feeling is cultivated with the help of the associate mind. As an example of such an association, Mill cites the case when an individual, having endured a certain suffering, sympathizes with another individual, seeing him in a similar situation. The same association is born in the mind of an individual when he is present when the rights and safety of another are violated. He involuntarily puts himself, the entire structure of his psyche, in the position of the victim, sympathizes with him; hence the desire to provide assistance in defense and to achieve punishment for the offender. If, according to Bentham, an individual is a complex of sensations, sometimes a complex of sensations consonant with another, then, according to Mill, an individual is not only a unity of sensations, but also a unity of intellectual associates secured by memory. From here, Mill’s view receives a broader horizon, and the neo-physical and metaphysical ones rejected by Bentham also enter into his field of vision.
logical concept. Bentham stuck to his narrow utilitarianism. Whereas Mill, using the idea of association and accumulation of associations and, without discarding the empirical genesis, makes an attempt to explain them and fills them with real content, of course, far from indisputable and definite. Raschonalism of the 18th stolfia created the idea of abstract khichnosti, linking it with the idea of nature. This person, with natural and inalienable rights, appeared, apparently, as Chase ex shashta. Although in reality it was preceded by a long process of accumulation of individualistic elements. The idea of the abstract individual, as we mentioned; was an idealistic method for enhancing the development of a specific individual with the same properties that were assumed in a natural individual. We see that Bentham already rebelled against this premise and made an attempt to take a different path in explaining and defining the essence of the individual. Vak we `widfli, according to his opinion, he set off in this determination from the properties of the empirical personality. Generalizing these properties, he applied them to all other individuals. L. S. Mill followed the teacher’s words in this regard. But from the animal properties of the human personality, he ascends, explaining this rise by the law of association, to the formation of the personality’s character through a constant rasonal selection of worthy pleasures, preferentially striving for these latter ones, in comparison with lower pleasures. From the animal feeling of revenge, when repelling attacks and from the sense of self-preservation, Mill goes back to explaining in the individual the formation of a complex sense of justice, with the help of the same law and feelings of sympathy. The feeling of revenge demands punishment of the offender. Corresponding to the sense of justice, gradually creating the concept of justice, it includes, in Mill’s opinion, the idea of personal right. Personal right is nothing more than the claim of the individual addressed to the social group,