The political individualism of the revolutionary Loktrina, fed by the theory of natural law, the accumulation of elements of which we have examined, had as its foundations: the idea of “personality and its innate rights, as well as the idea
1) The rationalistic doctrine of the 18th century that we examined paved a deep individualistic furrow in the legal consciousness of the 19th century. However, the beginning of this century was immersed in reaction. The rulers of Europe, having extinguished the military fire raised by Napoleon T, strained their efforts to eradicate revolutionary ideas from the subject peoples. They were practiced by theocrats and legitimists - Baip {-MagYp, Tozer 4e Maizyge, Re Vopa]a, Smeaschtao4 and others - in France; Bork with his book about the French revolution - in England; Haller (“Restoration”) and Kotzebue (“History of the Germans”)—in Herman, copies of both of these works were burned in 18117; in Wartburg when students celebrated the anniversary of the reform. The religious-spiritualistic and metaphysical lining of the works listed above takes us back to the familiar motifs of the Middle Ages and French legalists. However, along with them, works appear in German, French and English, where the individualism of the constituents is also subject to criticism and curtailment, but where the main liberation ideas of the French revolution find themselves not only at the same time, but also further developed - in addition to the construction of a new constitutional law on the foundations of liberalism. In these works, one very characteristic feature is noticeable, characteristic of the political teachings of the 19th century - a gradual deviation from the metaphysical concept of natural law. (Henri Michel examines this phenomenon in detail in relation to the French philosophy of the state (T/16e 4e G'61%) in 1898 and calls this the reason for the reaction against individualism. So
‚ for example, regarding Roye-26*
accurate contractual origin of the state. The first represented an atom of political organization, the second explained the gene-
Collara, Guizo, etc.: “[ez Fosy1ptaygez otb rgbep@i zeguy’ 1a saschze sha na- Ne, zap5 gbeoppa ie & Hague, and pos 4atz Gotage royaie, apepi @goy pafige]” 266 r.), that in Bentham, for example, takes on a downright hateful character relating to all political terminology declared, despite the fact that Bentham himself is a radical democrat.
True, the philosophy of law and the state of the first half of the 19th century in the European systems of Schelling and Hegel reaches the highest speculative perfection, and the first works of G. A. Fichte, individualistic in spirit, seem to continue the rationalism of the 18th century. But at the same time, the historical school of German jurists brings law down from metaphysical heights to earth, although it places it in the spiritualistic shell of the people's spirit. This shell was already placed on real historical soil. The word nasha was uttered, which the historical 19th was not slow to fill with real content, borrowed from the actual experienced history of the people, crystallized in the morals and customs of the people.