And the epithets: natural and political could not be connected by an equal sign, just as freedom and equality in the natural state could not be identical in the same way in 5aeiz SG: there they were protected by individual force, and natural equality, with the inequality of individual forces, could be interpreted as the qualities of a real pdey, and not only as a stoic mark about the same origin in nature, only Claim every object of nature as a form of equality. None other than Rousseau excellently explained that such equality of claims in the historical state is coming to an end ([e rtepueg, he exclaims pathetically, (fi auape eps10$ un fetgash, 5'auza Tse Fge, se1 eze & sho], its ftopua 4ez zepz azzeh zpiriez roshg 1e sgoshe, No. 6 1e uga? 4e 1a 506166 stupe *).
Between individuals and equality of claims grow: inheritance, hierarchy and subordination, privilege and subordination. In a political situation, the defender of rights, instead of individual ones, is a general force, subordinate to the general will.
Given the equality of the positions of the natural and political individual, it is necessary that the power of the political associate perform the functions of individual power and that the general will be subordinated to the individual. But the fact of the matter is that, according to Rousseau himself, the general force obeys the orders not of the individual, but of the general will. And that the general will can diverge from the individual will, this is also recognized
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Rousseau, although he explains such disagreement of the will as an individual mistake. John Stuart Mill, in his treatise “Op Pfegfu,” defending the freedom of the individual, said: “let everyone think differently from me, this will not diminish my right to think in my own way.” History truly discovered that sometimes “I” thought truly, while the whole world was mistaken. But Rousseau, as we will see below, believes that the general will cannot be mistaken, it is an indisputable and right will.
Thus, Rousseau himself, having masterfully posed the problem of political individualism, with his response pointed out the extraordinary difficulty and complexity of its solution. In his decision, Rousseau made a synthesis of elements, admittedly known long before him, but a synthesis that raised doubts about the possibility of preserving natural freedom. The author himself admits this not without sadness. But as a true rationalist, he believes that the task at hand is better fulfilled by his ideas and their design, in which he imagined “un social life.” And it’s not his fault that the people “eopuegpeten 51 pagEa\ ne sopulep times.”
Even earlier, Rousseau, a political theorist, as we have seen, presented examples of a different solution to the same problem in Locke, and before him in Spinoza. The meaning of their decision: a natural individual, entering a political society, cannot, by human nature itself, alienate all his rights.
If complete renunciation of rights is unthinkable, it can be partial. It is remarkable that Rousseau himself willingly admitted: “what everyone renounces is only part of what is necessary for social life.”
Even so, he saw the danger of leaving even part of natural rights to the individual. In his opinion,
1) Rousseau says that the actual renunciation of one’s rights does not occur in the contract, but that the situation of individuals, by virtue of it, becomes better than before. (See below).
[fragment illegible in the scan of the first edition]