MediaArhiv

Part 9

page 100/124

To resolve this issue, Mill proposes the following practical principle: “the greatest possible fragmentation of power, with the full achievement of those goals that power must have, and at the same time the greatest possible centralization of knowledge and the greatest possible output of this. knowing from the center."

As an example of the application of the rule he recommended, Mill pointed to the states of New England.

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We have seen how Mill tried, rising above narrow empiricism, to understand and explain the individual not only from the sensory side, but also from the intellectual side. On the basis of this understanding, Mill gave the image of the moral and political individual. Moreover, the genesis of ethical, social and political feelings and ideas, as well as the basis of their development, is rooted, according to his opinion, in the natural feelings of community life and in the law of association. Mill's individualism is the individualism of associationism. Mill abstracts the individual

1) He touches on this issue in his treatise on political economics. 28*

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anise viaa development of the environment and monitor it in an individual person, exposing her feelings and ideas to observation. Behavioral norms are formed through individual experience, or, better to say, a series of individual experiences. These experiences, due to the laws of sympathy, association and harmony of interests, receive social significance. Social norms were explained by Mill partly mechanically, as well as political norms. Their task is to determine conditions favorable for the development of individuality. Individuality is the ferment of the following social and political changes. As a result of this concept, it seemed that everyone (ontogenetically) goes through the path of mechanical assimilation of social experience. and make it better. Mill lost sight of the social environment, as an organized experience, on the individual. The social environment, be it society or the state, was viewed as a set of external conditions adapted to the requirements of individuality. This is the main motive of his treatise “Op Pegebu”. If we express this motive in political and legal terms, omitting for a moment its peculiar genetic justification, then isn’t it clear that the rights to individual freedom are not given by the state, but constitute a vital requirement of a person’s personality, conditioned by its nature. In essence, this is the very result that constitutes the quintessence of the revolutionary doctrine in relation to the theory of individual rights. If this is indeed the case, then it is difficult for us to understand why the theory of political individualism cannot find another justification that is not contained in the concepts of a noumenal, rationally and generally metaphysically explained individual. We have just examined one of the justifications that claims to be empiricist in Mill. It is more accessible to explanation, so to speak, more provable, even though the aforementioned justifications are of a metaphysical nature. If it contains known deficiencies from which it is not free

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