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— 403 —true Before the revolutionary era, they had no practical impact on life, because “they were forgotten or resistance to the autocratic, which he recognizes as artificial. (See his posthumous work. “Ronik oeg r ozoryzeve Z(aaveige”).
This inclination towards the completion of a priori will be built with the results of exact knowledge. noted by us in Fries, not without intention, placed next to Fichte, to reveal a tendency that irresistibly made its way into the philosophy of law and state of the 19th century, even in the birthplace of speculation - Germany, Gdz Lazarus, Steital, Simmel and others. busy with enormous preparations for some kind of communion
The first task is to give a definition of the principle that is built on many thousands of painstaking observations. Among German philosophers, in the family of Fichte, in relation to the Thames under consideration, - among the French - in the family of Benjamin Constant, who sought to build a political concept on purely rational principles - we find the embodiment of rationalistic principles in TT or other varying constructions; they sometimes introduce digital political form. In political details. But we do not find any other basis for political individualism, other than those discussed above. If Benjamin Constant—typical, L.) who gave the descriptionand a significant publicist of the first quarter of the 19th ‹ did not list individual rights (among them he mentioned those omitted by declaring: “Wow Fazzoslay from her Che g6ish! op”), we do not find any new foundations for the direction we are considering, but we come across an interesting feature that deserves to be noted. Benjamin Constant partially adhered to the revolutionary doctrines before the era of the Convention, many of which he rejected. He stands for the supreme power of the people, as a theoretical substantiation of a political construct, he introduces amendments to Movtesquier’s theory of separation of powers, which he has assimilated, and finally, he everywhere repudiates his basic principle, which makes him, in this respect, akin to Locke; Citizens owe individual rights neither to society nor to the state. But to whom or what? — here the pope has extinguished18 political individualism. We will not find a definitive answer to this from the French publicist. From many of his pamphlets and articles on state law, it is clear that he does not recognize freedom as a metaphysical property of the individual, innate to him, and does not recognize equality. He refers to experience as a possible source of explanation and construction of this or that political structure, and, following Montesquieu, he is inclined to look for freedom in the national character, morals, and customs of citizens. But when he has to say the final word and make a choice between U0.06 and fbok, as the final foundations of law and the state, he chooses nature (T.G. No. 4e), realizing the uncertainty of this concept. And he chooses because the law is something that is sometimes filled with even contradictory content, while the concept of nature is more or less the same for all people. It is impossible not to recognize the whole the superficiality of such an explanation, reminiscent of the story that there may be a misplaced idea of a person who is faced with a fatal problem.
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he ikkh Fozchebki were despised." The “individual” mind clarified them into the legal consciousness of humanity and the will could realize them in reality. But such an ahistorical view completely left without explanation: for what reasons did the development of political institutions take place in historical reality, which contradicted these primordial and indisputable truths of political life? For what reasons were freedom and equality recognized as necessary conditions for the existence of an individual? What is the basis of the very idea of a contract?