The citizen lives a double life: as a member of the sovereignty and as a private citizen. There is a clear difference with the ancient point in vain, which dissolved the seed of private freedom into political freedom. The idea of a citizen, that is, a member of the state, rested there solely on the possession of political freedom. And there were political parties; but the concept of social, civil life remained alien to them. Yes, it did not find roots in life, since with the exception of some philosophical schools, the vital interests of the citizens of the ancient state were organically connected with political freedom and the practical implementation of sovereignty.
Montesquieu distinguishes a special sphere of citizens' lives, regulated by civil laws, which, in his opinion, rests on the relationship of freedom to the individual citizen, and not to the state. Montesquieu understood too one-sidedly the legal norms that regulate the relations of the last category. / We see that in the 12th books he defended freedom of thought, oral and printed word, in another he advocated tolerance for heterodox confessions. He speaks, for example, in the 12th book about lese majeste, uncovering conspiracies (crimes of a political nature), saying that the position of the seal is difficult for everything in despotic states. He expresses himself very characteristically about satirical works. “In despotic states, where depression on the one hand, and ignorance on the other, do not give either the desire or the ability to study. by them."
These rules include: itself “freedom in relation to the citizen,” but on the other hand, in relation to the state
— 339 gift, about which Montesquieu does not make theoretical generalizations, but this connection is also observed by him.
For it is clear that a greater or lesser degree of such freedom is associated with the difference in the image of a right-handed person. “Since in republics the other evils that people complain about appear to be menfe and not so intrusive, and the laws speak about them, apparently, of the whole bolfe, and the executors of the laws are all menfe, then freedom is usually identified with republics, excluding it from the monarchy.”
It can be seen that Montesquieu's individualism rests only on the opposition of the freedom of the individual to absolutism, to which he opposes the moral right, and only in his opinion is political freedom, guaranteed by the split of the authorities, but not on the opposition of the individual to the state; (It must be noted, however, that the concept in the prevailing doctrines of states in this era (post-Middle Ages) almost merged with the concept of absolute states?).
The solution to the problem of political individualism (in the theoretical formulation of which, as we will see, he is less radical than Rousseau) occurs not through limiting the rights of the state, but through limiting the rights of the bearers of power. He says: “S’ese ipe ehretepse eegpePe dae foiyo Poshishe da a Chi ropuosh ezyo roteb A ei aBizeg her ua ]lazasch’A se di’I ftotsue 4ez ShiTez.” There is only one way out from here for the freedom of the individual: "rag 1a @15roz op 4ez sVozez 1e ropuoy agg@e 1e rotsuosh."
The first mutual restraint of power occurred, as we said ‘), at the moment of the struggle for the individual between spiritual and secular power. Montesquieu now raises a similar mutual restraint into a political theory, which, as it were, says to the individual: @\1ae, if Peg 915.
The remedy proposed by Montesquieu did not fully solve the problem he set—limiting arbitrariness. The authorities
1) See the first part of our book.
They bordered each other, crushing the individual, but within the limits of their own competence, each power did not encounter restrictions. A law could be such a limit for judicial and executive power. But. If the authorities had kept within the limits of the law, then, obviously, there would have been no need to limit them. For the law would then be the same curb for them.
But what about the legislative power?
It is within its competence to repeal one and issue another, directly opposite law, threatening, for example, freedom itself, both political and individual. Suppose the executive power, to which Montesquieu entrusted the right to convene representatives, does not convene them and, becoming uncontrolled, tramples on the individual freedom of citizens?