The theoretical separation of religious and legal norms of understanding?) had the following significance for the individualistic direction. It eliminated the heteronomous normopony", | mache for the individual and opened up the possibility of constructing an autonomous legal normative understanding, limited to the boundaries of the earthly realm. This meant that from now on, political philosophy from the eschotological, religious goal was brought to its immediate subject: to the study of the only earthly form of communication between people and intelligent nature the individual, whose properties determined this form. Thus, Groshy consolidates, in relation to politics, the humanistic ideas of the Renaissance, which we discussed above.
But Groshi went and did another favor | individualistic direction, going hand in hand with the ethical thinkers mentioned in the previous chapter. He singled out from the religious (ritual) morality a natural morality, which he wears A pazvane “ie paishae 1akhz” (its sopipe rgaesera shogapa).
This latter, in turn, is separated, according to Grosch, from 115 paegae $0sia]e (i.e., from natural law in its own right)
1) Although the orthodox argued “pop ©83e riternia iv pabigae ezvepau, pes sopeCI gaz paishgae geshovo Peo rovze.” Nept1sy Sossey soshtesh {ama Nisopuz btob1, Oe-ite Re] as rav MOSS. U. U. es yo Sh. 16-24,
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no meaning). For an explanation of the fupkshi of ethics, (15 paeigae ]ah!15) - which also deserves attention when discussing the value of Grosh. in the development of the ideas of political ‘individualism,’ Groszhy applies the Aristotellan theometric proportion, and not the ariometic or equalizing one. The latter is assigned to him to explain the function of law. In other words, in Grosh we have a proponent of legal egalitarianism, i.e. equality of legal conditions for the existing individual, contrary to the hierarchical views of the Middle Ages, which obscured the Christian idea of fundamental equality before God the Father.
In order to put an end to the significance of Grosh, in turn to our topics in the field of law and move on to the same assessment of it in the field of philosophy of the state, we will point out the position that it occupies among modern philosophical and legal trends. Grosh’s position in relation to scholastic philosophy of law is noted above.
What position does he have in relation to the skeptical direction? The father of the philosopher of law of modern times obviously disagrees with Pascal, who argued that three degrees from the pole turns the whole jurisprudence upside down. Law has its own eras, as is evident from the diversity and even contradiction of legal phenomena at different times. What is true on one side of the Pyrenees is false on the other.
According to Grotio, the rational and sociable nature of man contains properties that are independent of eras and geo-
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s: assholes in fuck arising from this nature are also eternal and constant. Positive. but law is, in essence, the development of the principles of natural law (Prheiovotepa 15: eshe uego | si. 18 pabatae $ $ age race and Vos fote 1aga land Nahegip®; also see prot. 8). But, while remaining the same, the basis of positive law does not prevent the latter from accepting different