1) In the same chapter he says: “The right of the current landowners can be fairly eliminated only if there is a previous right of the society taken as a whole; 3, this prior right of the society consists of the sum of the separate rights of its members.
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and EO anietsanniya
— 448 wages, etc.). The rights of the individual, recognized earlier than others, the rights of freedom, belief, worship, speech and sorrow, are set out by Spencer in conclusion, since they are the most objectionable to them.
Once we recognize the gradual recognition of the individual's subjective and political rights, Opener draws a conclusion that he recognizes as also true regarding all previous aspects of individual freedom. The expansion of these rights will go to the border with the izmfnesh of a number of states. We find three such types in Spencer. Two pure and one mixed, or transitional. The type of militant state, based on agricultural disciplines, and the industrial type, based on contractual principles; finally, the middle ground between these two final moments of state evolution.
Since the song of the state is war or readiness and desire for war%; which is usually expressed by the word militarism, insofar as it becomes necessary for the individual to be subordinated to the state. And vice versa, peacefully minded tribes and states engaged in cultural work exhibit a tendency towards ‘individual freedom’.
States of the SMF type are characterized by such a system; which allows for a combination or compromise between freedom and the subordination of the individual, tfm greater, chfm bolfe develop militarism in countries and freedom, tfm greater, chfm boyafe develop peaceful industrialism in countries. At present, there is not yet a state that has implemented in its life the law of equal freedom for individuals. But the social development of the state follows the path of greater and greater realization of the law of freedom, as these “imperatives of moral consciousness, resulting from continuous social discipline” tell us and how to lead us to this “generalization of human experience, as far as it is recorded in the subsequent developmental
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1$ restrictions are recognized as mental in relation to | <freedom of the press, moving it around., and mental only in | case of defensive policy. An aggressive policy cannot serve as a justification for restrictions, since it is a deviation from the normal tendency: to approach the implementation of the law of equal freedom. | Protection of the species by victims of individual individuals, based penalty type. In an attack, this need disappears because it is not consistent with the law of equal freedom, because the attacker claims greater freedom than the object of the attack. 1
| the ethical postulate is caused by the need to preserve |
The aforementioned division of the state into military and labor types serves as a framework for Spencer in his further research regarding the nature, structure, limits of the state’s activities and the position of the individual in the state.
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As for the last question, for the main thing, Spencer, as we have seen, determines the relationship of the individual to the state, based on the recognition of natural rights for the individual, i.e., freedom in which the state should not interfere. Moreover, the natural rights of the individual are the basis of legislation and state institutions.
wait. Spencer more than once emphasizes the fact that human$- | chesny law is equal to limited freedom to follow from |
“the laws of life, as it continues in the social state” 0. And therefore the types of freedom listed above are only rights in their own sense. Social institutions only exert a certain influence on the rights of individuals (that is, the various aspects of equally limited freedom).- | They may or may not be in accordance with them, but the social institutions themselves do not create rights. Do not create new rights and active participation of individuals in | qualities" of representatives of these institutions (legislators and rulers). Having established the essence of a means of maintaining rights, | their representatives bear the duties imposed on these institutions.
If the purpose of institutions is to support rights, and rights relate to them as ends to means, then it is clear that attributing the name rights to political 2) rights is a grave mistake and is what Spencer is primarily trying to disprove.
That part in political power, says Spencer, which the citizens of the most advanced nations have, and which, as experience has shown, is a good guarantee of life, liberty and property, is considered as follows.