individualistic or anarchic. Namely, those who, looking at Herbert Spepser, stand on the border between the political and the pure
1) Geaf ee zez Shpiez zi Fezza!z roYchiez her. Rushz. 1863—Rag Eyopaga Gafoshaue..
In it we do not develop a central doctrine that develops the original foundations of political individualism. But what is remarkable is that Laboulaye, working on the essential features of his individualism, (where the doctrine of individual rights is presented along with the theory of non-intervention of the state in the economic field), Benjamin Conotan, begins his research with the characteristic words of that tendency in political science of which we have spoken: 4'ozeguaYop opyo tepopue18 1ez zepsez ryzyatsez, ep top'at ragushchone (ev 1015 sbibga]ez at! tboepi her exprIacheov 11a she var16 6 4ez rbbpotepez, | ezE Ga! npe gbuoa ov 4e shbshe from@ge Chapz 1ez eez ai: otb GVoshshe roig o]ee. gotsuegnenv 1ez 506164682“, (p. 1) “Pesotsugi: eez 1015 ChiЁ g6o1zzepe 1e tope togaye, {ee ezyo Goetsuge dce zergoroze 1e ryYozorme swarm!ychie (p. 2).
[fragment illegible in the scan of the first edition]
individualism to such a degree that Huxley characterizes their term “administrative pigilizu”. The fundamental qualification of some of the positions of speciesism as aparchy is rooted in Spencer’s “absolute ethics”, when it assumes that an empirical individual has achieved absolute morality. In imagining such an individual, the category of life (the basis of morality according to Speneer) seems to merge with the category of duty. The dualism that we identified in post-Faristotelian practical philosophy seems to be disappearing under the weight of the universal hypothesis of the English thinker. The Stoics sovftovali zespa it pubgat \1uete. For an absolutely moral individual, this principle is, as it were, unnecessary: to act immorally or unlawfully (which for Spencer merges into the concept of absolute justice) is impossible. For the laws of behavior are identical to the laws of the individual and social nature of man. Hence the need for an internal coercive, social and political apparatus. (However, according to Spencer, exceptions are possible). It is here, in considering the subject of our study, that we reach a deep preflation, that brink when the political form is, as it were, a falling away form, like the husks of a fruit or the shells from which the nascent substance flies out. It is a facet of the idea of a political individual. For the understanding of a political individual is inconceivable, absolutely, without the understanding of the political environment, just as it is unthinkable without @utsav.
It is impossible not to admit that political individualism has in mind only the contingent, and not the absolutely free, individual. An absolutely free personality is genetically and theoretically the basis of aparchy, not political, individualism. And Stirper (Kaspar Schmidt) 5 sees in her nothing other than striving for her all-
1) Or. to her.
glad Go: AOI AI RAS NVA NEA ICHNNZHK IIA, =