Diderot and Saint-Lambert and Volney are philosophers of the same ilk as Hobbes, whom they, in Guyot's words, corrected with Locke. Sometimes it was pointed out that these prerequisites made it possible to build a completely consistent and logical system of absolute statism, even in the forms of autocracy. But this is not entirely fair. If Hobbes's system were consistent and logical, then one would have to admit one of two things: either that the accepted individualistic premises are common to all schools of natural law; consistently developed, they can be brought to their complete denial, i.e., led to absurdity (which is what happened with Hobbes), or that such a result can be achieved by hidden contradiction or by the same deviation from accepted principles.
Of the two hypotheses that Hobbes had to choose from: transferring natural rights to the whole body and, therefore, giving all the powers to an unlimited ruler forever, or only part of the rights, Hobbes, as is known, settled on the first. Already a quarter of the way through, Spinoza was inclined to accept the second hypothesis and pointed out that it is impossible to transfer without reserve to the authorities all natural rights belonging to the individual and arising from the fundamental properties of human nature, without going into conflict with nature itself. And it is precisely this human nature, with its inherent properties, that the legislator himself is limited in publishing.
The arbitrariness and lack of proof of the hypothesis adopted by Hobbeom was even better understood in the 18th century during the era of the great French revolution. Camille Desmoulins 1) to say that it would be completely absurd to assert that people, having formed a social union for protection from robbers,
t) Sasha Oezshotsi te. 1.a Egypte te 1789. b. 19.
— 275 would have given the supreme power itself the right to rob them (including social activists). A public union may have rights other than those granted to it by persons included in the union.
But it seems to us that Hobbe, having settled on his gynothesis, so sympathetic to absolutism, lost sight of another essential circumstance. Having drawn a picture of natural internecine strife and having settled on the very probable assumption that not a single individual possesses such strength that could guarantee him victory over others, just as not a single individual is so weak that one cannot be afraid of him, the philosopher suggested that the instinct of self-preservation and fear for one’s life prompt one to agree to renounce the use of one’s strength, i.e., natural law. This is the only way to achieve peace. In this case, the state—the monarch—becomes the bearer and unlimited owner of the alienated natural right (Hobbes favors the sides of this form).
Wasn’t Hobbes’s entire task to end the natural state, replacing it with the state? And in essence, with his Gobbe system, he solves the problem only in half. The natural state - and how Hobbes did not notice this - continues to exist. If we take his point of view, then we must admit that it was not the transformation of the natural state into the lytical, i.e., not the transformation of natural rights into citizenship, but only the transfer of natural rights. Before the agreement, they belonged to each individual individually. After the treaty, they belong to the regsopae suNise, i.e., in the desired form of Hobbes' right-handed monarch'). The monarch is the successor of the natural state, eliminate
D) Afterwards Locke (T\uo geoses op Souegpeten&) without pointing to Hobbes. but in complete contrast to him, he argued that only parliament