It seems to me that M. M. Kovalevsky should say that until now sufficient attention has not been paid to the fact that neither Rousseau, nor Mably, nor the least are opponents of the theory of separation and equality of powers, which Montesquieu considered a necessary condition for political freedom.
The same idea about the unity of doctrine, but from a different point of view, is supported by Henri Michel in his book (The Idea of the State). Kovalevsky pays attention mainly to the difference in political views between Montesquieu and Rousseau, which he tries to reduce to one doctrine. Henri Michel says that if Montesquieu said at the Constituent Assembly, and Rousseau at the Convention, if the Constituent Assembly turned out to be more individualistic, and the Convention more statistic, this is because the principles of 1191 and 1193 only complemented the program of the declaration of the constituents, which did not express all individualism. The legislative sanction of the mentioned principles legitimized their tendency to “contribute to the formation of a large number of fully developed and true individualities” through moral and material assistance. Henri Michel agrees with E. SBatr!op, to whom Kovalevek!y also refers (Jew @4e 1a, teuoay from). that the Constituent Assembly pursued the principle of freedom, and the Convention equality. Condoree also pointed out the mutual dependence of these principles.
Alternatively, to assert that Montesquieu’s political theory is the theory of liberal constitutionalism, then in Rousseau we find clearly expressed republican and radical democratic sympathies, under the auspices of popular rule, and in accordance with this difference, we see in the revolutionary era the dominance of two opposing currents.
So Laurent, (Esh4ez zig Gaucher ae GrashapIb. vol. 13. p. 482. rg. no.) to whom M. M. Kovalevek refers, says “the French revolution!”
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We must remember that Rousseau could express himself freely and directly where Montesquieu spoke in analogies and allusions.
Montesquieu, following his predecessors, led the theory of separation of powers, in which the main role was given to the legislator - the people, especially with his chapters on democracy (2 books) to show the way, and the straightforward Rousseau came directly to the idea of popular supremacy and autocratic rule of the people.
We will not present their theories, but we will try to indicate the relationship of these theories to our topic. In the 11th and 12th books of his work, Montesquieu gives the theory of an intellectual political individualism. Defending the rights of a citizen to freedom of thought, spoken and printed word '), religious tolerance, inviolability of the home *) - Montesquieu classifies them as civil liberties. Civil freedom, in his terminology and explanation, consists of a citizen’s confidence in his own safety *). Montesquieu does not add here that this security lies precisely in the non-violation of the rights protected by it on the part of the state itself. Therefore, it seems, judging by the contents of the 12th book, that for him the individual freedom of a citizen does not relate to the political system, that is, it is not established by fundamental laws represents two opposite currents. One school (Moptesquieu, Voltaire) demands freedom, meaning human rights. She also wants the sovereignty of the people, but as a political guarantee and to ensure the free activity of the individual. Next to it there is another school (Rousseau, Mably), which also writes the word freedom on its banner, but for it freedom consists in the right to be a sovereign. She willingly mixes it with equality. In order to win this equality, she does not retreat even at the thought of sacrificing our personal rights or the state.”
Ten ([e8 om1pes 4e 1a Ehapse sobetrogate. U. 1. G. U v. 1-TU) is distinguished by the liberalism of the principles of 1789 and the absorption of the individual by the state of the Jacobins (Rousseau's school).
[fragment illegible in the scan of the first edition]
2) ХХШ ch. No.; about religious tolerance book. 25 ch. X.
3) k.HI. Ch. G
E OE,
(constitutional) - and civil laws. By civil laws, which, in Montesquieu's opinion, are primarily concerned with individual freedom, he means criminal laws (in monarchs and policemen). Consequently, those rights that modern doctrine calls subjective political rights are classified by the author as private law.
This seems to be in contradiction with our indication of the connection between individual freedom and fundamental or constitutional laws.