— 258 — graphic degrees. Postulates of natural law, basis specific forms, depending on time and space. In thus explaining the modification of positive law, Grosh is far from empiricism and Carneadian. skepticism, which Pascal and partly Montaigne seem to be approaching in this matter. We recognize the empirical individual as the basis of positive law, and | Indeed, it served as an explanation for the feudal law of force. Not only the Pyrenees, but also the rocks on which the castles of the feudal lords were located, separated areas with different legal orders. The physical strength of the Rypar squads, on the other hand. On the other hand, the force of habit, which Pascal points out, served as the basis of law and order. Natural law, according to Grosh’s doctrines, could only be the basis for the denial of such a medieval legal order and the creation of a new legal outlook. Instead of the aristocracy of power, Grosh points out the uselessness of democracy, i.e., assigning to each person a rational nature as the basis of law. It is the right to interpret Grosh as a set of natural conditions, recognized and recognized by reason, conditioned by nature | person and the same for each individual. Human nature is not only intelligent, but also sociable. It is the source of agreement between people and the basis for observing these agreements. Failure to comply with such agreements is an order contrary to natural law. It entails disrespect for the personality of another, we have no respect for the personality, i.e., not
Justice
However, by introducing the element of contract in the concept of positive law, Groshjine follows Eikur’s utilitarianism entirely. Agreement; Of course, it is useful to people, but salva rgohia, agreement is a reasonable and sociable nature of a person, and benefit is only sazza geshoya. Therefore, the contract is not an empirical and accidental result of this nature, but a natural, necessary form of the legal order.
Thus, combine the elements of the Stoic and Epicurean legal outlook: elements of necessity and elements of participation in the formation of the legal order of the human will (agreement), which ultimately also depends on the properties of human nature. The second elements, in particular, appear in Grosh’s theory of state law?). This is already evident from his definition of the state. (Stutsaz e3yo soebaz regesviz Shegogita Votan, 1011$ Yogler 1 her soshshitz chi aY$ samza zosayiv 1. [. 6. G. 14).
To this it is definitely necessary to add that, according to Grotius, the source of state law is the obligation to comply with contracts. And in the foundations of the perfect community of free people (i.e., the state) lies that property of the human personality, which Groshchy calls ‘arrey- {18 zosmebaiz. Before us is not only the embryo of the contractual theory of the state, but an attempt to explain state existence by the property inherent in each of the constituent parts of the state union, i.e., by the property of the human personality. An attempt to explain the nature of the state by the nature of man. The individualistic direction of such a theory is beyond doubt. This is especially significant if we compare Grosh’s explanations with the explanations
1) Rgo]eboshepa $3 U, XY XUSH, XUP.
2) State law is called civil law by Groshch, see correct. G. G. S. T. X\U1. S. Sh. 3 U.
previous writers of the ethic and theocratic periods.
In some points of his teaching, Grotsai ‘quite clearly’ aligns himself with the predecessors of political individualism and borrows some principles of their theories, but without extreme conclusions and in a significantly softened form.
Thus, Grosh’s teaching about sovereignty continues to develop the ideas of Marsil of Padua and, in part, even the Tyranomachus. The subject of power, according to Grosh, (zaMesviy soshiite)\), is the people. True, Groschey is the bearer of sovereignty and the sovereign in the quality of ziesii rgorgiii ®) power, but from which it is clear that the people always remain the basis of power (as, for example, in the event of the termination of the power of the sovereign), and the sovereign is the body of power of the common subject - the people. Here one can see a modification and softening of the democratic views of the tyranomaches. More recently, in the teachings of Grosch, it is reflected in the provisions he accepts: 1) The sovereign is for the state, and not the other way around. The sovereign is authorized by the people to carry out the duties of his subjects. 2) Subjects have the right to resist the tyrant. Later, however, the situation is subject to restrictions. Based on the resistance of my subjects. the sovereign Grotsai should be considered in the event that the sovereign has and discovers disastrous plans for the country (VozII apppo p foniz roriy ehyit Fegafig) E)