The reaction against theology and scholasticism also affected significant changes in the ideal of contract, adopted by the doctrine of natural law, an idea that middle-class politicians loved to use and which, as we have seen, the tyranomaches made revolutionary against absolutism. These changes have an obvious connection with the understanding of personality, which has become clearer to a certain extent, based on the idea of the rational nature of man. This connection is not difficult to understand if we remember the contracting parties of the Tyranomachus, who were still under a strong relipous indentation, if we remember the distribution between the contractors.
agents of rights and obligations among them and - in the doctrine of doctrine. 18*
uneven natural law of the next century. A representative of the monarchical power, who played such a serious role as an independent participant in the treaty in the 16th century. fade into the background in the design of the state contract 17 vbka. Starting from Grosh, the citizens themselves are the authorized participants in such an agreement. They, their will, are the quality of the agreement. Sovereigns—this idea is already in embryo among the tyrannomaches—to rule under restrictions and under the strict control of the people, and according to Rousseau’s theory (Soshegai 5. Sh. 1. 18. TU. 3), rulers are the essence of persons, without mere duties. The transition from absolute statism to political individualism can be figuratively represented as follows: The absolute monarch said: “the state is me.” According to the theory of the Tyranomachus, the sovereign could say that the state is partly me. According to the dominant theory of the state contract of the 17th century, 1) the sovereign could only say that the state is, among other things, my power, entrusted to many people, & according to Rousseau’s theory, the state is the people and nothing more, and the rulers are entrusted with only one responsibility.
The turn made by the school of natural law towards strongly individualistic principles in the history of the philosophy of the state, from a political point of view in vain, can be characterized by the fact that from now on the state was not a function, but a means for man. The clarity and strengthening of such a vision was a major merit of individualism.
THOSE
We do not intend to expound the well-known teachings of representatives of the doctrine of natural law in the 17th century. We will take this doctrine in full swing, marking only
1) With the exception of Hobbes' theory, which is inconsistent, as we will see below.
Their modifications and contradictions, their influence, are more important for our urgent task.
Despite the differences in teaching among the authors of this stolfia, who wrote about natural law, the basic elements of their doctrine of bole or menfe are the same.
Whatever properties are not ascribed to an individual or a human atom (arreyeiz zosieyaz, (Penny) those, sire! Naz (Hobbes, Spinoza), etc.), it is they that attract the individual to cohabitation and the political forms of this cohabitation—the state. It is they who make of a natural person, who in the natural state does not have any concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, and who is guided in his attitude towards other individuals solely by the power of his being; it is they who force a person to regoing from Az PabagaIz to Zaz ©1\8. This transition takes place through an agreement between individuals. An agreement is a necessary way out of the natural state. By contract, individuals undertake to renounce their natural rights and transfer them to the state. Question on which teachers of natural law give a different answer, do individuals renounce all natural rights, or some? This question is central to determining the degree of individualistic attitude of each representative of the doctrine of natural law.
Gobbe, despite the individualistic premises, which he not only accepts, but the creator of which he is largely the creator of (for the new philosopher of law), considers this question in the sense of the renunciation of individuals from all their natural rights in favor of the state, whatever the form of that state. In this regard, Hobbes's account emerges as a blur among
1) See, for example, his Pgae. in op. “Re@uez. To explain the state, it is necessary to proceed from the nature of the individual person.
liberals learn from utilitarians. Helvesh, and Holbach and