— 276 which was Hobbes' task. And if the natural state continues to exist, albeit in such partial forms, then this does not completely exclude the possibility of internecine war and in no case will a lasting peace be achieved. And reasoning sensibly, instead of a war of the natural state, as such, a war of all against all, as a final result in Hobbes’s construct, we have the full possibility of a war of ‘one, invested with rights and power, against all who are supposedly deprived or have deprived themselves of such power and such rights. And won’t it be in the end (as history has shown more than once) that the result of Hobbism is a war of all against one, when they understand the whole fiction of such an agreement. The necessity of such a war, as we have seen, was proved a hundred years before Hobbes by the young man La Boessy in his treatise “Sopa” et op Pizsopgs Che 1a zegunae vootaye”, which we examined. Spinoza, in many respects assimilated and applied to his philosophy the rights of individualistic premises of Hobbes 1); apparently, foresaw the possibility of such an outcome for the monarch when he asserted that the duration of the state - which he considered a lesser evil, compared with the natural state, is conditioned by the preservation of the power of the ruler. This was a very real basis, before which subjects could be kept in obedience without any self-denial.
ment is an institution under which the anarchy of natural society truly ceases. Laws passed by the majority are made binding on all citizens. Those who stand outside the laws, in essence, continue to remain in the state of nature, and not in civil society (Noo Shapt Sui Zos1efu). On the other hand, if we allow absolute, unrestrained arbitrariness of power, according to I: Locke, subjects are deprived of even that natural right of self-defense and lynching, which they enjoy in Zabiz payiaIs. (SJ.UP). From here, the half-heartedness of Hobbism becomes even more clear: all natural rights, individuals pass in civil status to one supreme power, the people remain nothing to do with it. And, indeed, one cannot but agree with Locke that the situation of the individual is even worse than in the natural state.
1) Compatriots of Hobbea, following English!Ysk1e. philosophers Locke, Berkeley, Clarke and others: always put Spinoza side by side with Hobbes:
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But regardless of all these considerations, there is enough to convince us that the individualization of Hobbes, from whom he starts in his construction, is not at all doomed to bankruptcy, ‘carefully prepared for him by the “English radical, in the service of reaction”’). Even if we agree with the monstrous absolutism of “Lenaean”, which, if you like, is an echo of the Roman Caesarism of Nero or Calligula (with its great Chit theme), then we must not forget for one minute that the philosopher himself actually logically convinced his age that the basis of this absolutism was, after all, the will of individuals. (Fullier in his 1'Н15. ©. 4е 1а рно$ says: Gobbey from the fact that the interests of society must be ensured by the strongest possible bonds, leading to the conclusion that absolutism and despotism are in the interests of society. But even recognizing Hobbes's principle - the principle of interest - his conclusion will be false, because despotism is not at all the greatest force that can support social bonds, and freedom is much more powerful in this regard than physical force).
If it can be proven that the state,
with which Hobbes replaces the natural state, is a synonym for a lawless state for the individual, then he is right. But, from the point of view of the very principles of Hobbes’s philosophy of the state, a state without rights for an individual is, indeed, nothing more than a renunciation of natural rights, and to refuse them completely would mean to renounce one’s own nature. Is such an individual’s desire possible and feasible, from the point of view of a philosopher who based his political philosopheme on the properties
- pelovVchesky nature? It turns out some kind of magic circle.
For Hobbes, such a question would inevitably arise as a negative instance.
1) Expressed by Tulloch.
The basic premises of Hobbes's philosophy in its political part are presented by a number of assumptions that mathematicians make in order to then present arguments. But Gobbe did not provide such evidence. That is why what he did for political individualism outlived what he undertook with such conviction and earnestness in the pursuit of absolutism.
To a large extent, Hobbes's political errors were corrected by Spinoza. This one posed the question directly. constituent nerve of political individualism: can an individual renounce the properties of his nature and sacrifice?