not a single social concept, then these shortcomings are partly eliminated by Herbert (Spencer), to a detailed consideration of whose doctrine, in the parts relating to our topic, we are now moving on. But on the other hand, Milia’s justification also contains advantages, in comparison with the metaphysical doctrine of the political individual. In fact, the purely rationalistic and metaphysical doctrine of natural law could not abandon some mystical mixing of rights - properties with personality. On the other hand, also asserting that the personality ‘with its inalienable rights is an active ferment of the political environment, which’ it can shape, at its own discretion,’ the representatives of the revolutionary doctrine, since it was expressed, for example, in the declarative constitutions, left’ without a proper ‘and acceptable’ explanation precisely the fact of the passive, until now, status of the individual, in relation to the demand for recognition of their innate rights. What such status was actually understood by them as passive, is clear from the above, explaining what they gave the inactivity of the sacred rights of the individual 1). And that such an explanation is not enough is shown, perhaps, by the insistence of the essay. It shows how individualistic elements gradually grew in historical and political teaching and how these elements crystallized into a rationalistically systematized “revolutionary doctrine.” If in Bentham, rather than in Mill, we encounter a different basis, the metaphysical natural right, innate to the individual, by which the citizen is protected from the omnipotence of the state, as Spinoza and Locke also thought, then shouldn’t the idea of the empirical individual, put forward by utilitarianism, play the same role in relation to the limitation of state absolutism, i.e. peculiar
1) Before the era of renolution.
and oiiiiiiension red rhea dew understood; explained and understood about human nature, the existence of which, according to the laws of life, is unthinkable without recognizing the known conditions of its existence. Why not call these conditions of existence, whether the innate right of the personality, or the form of its individual-functional development, the result is opin: the social and political environment cannot encroach on their denial without prejudice to the laws of development of human nature and humanity. Thus, instead of the ethic, theocratic and metaphysical-individualistic understanding of norms through which the development of the direction that interests us passed, we have in English philosophy a new and, above all, methodological phase of it: an attempt to understand norms based on the empirical method of studying the laws of human nature. But where to look for retaria step/atsai 05, based not on narrow observations of the development and improvement of the individual personality, but on the general laws of nature, among which the individual lives and which should not be considered only as an internal environment for the activity of the individual, but as a material that shapes or is formed into individual individuals - this is a question that went beyond the background of empirical generalizations Mill. And we can tell another about the relationship between the individual and the environment. Benthamism and Mill's empiricism could not give there is no other explanation for this last day, except problematic identity is of interest and sympathy on the basis of a natural sense of communication. It was all the more difficult to prove the identity of these interests, standing on the point of view of egoism, i.e., “constantly gravitating towards oneself,” which, according to the empirical end of utilitarianism, would have to begin all over again the associative work of transforming egoism into sympathy and altruism. Mill gave a very vague formula for delimiting individual interests from the intrusion of society and the state, but did not go further
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a formula that could coordinate both TV and other interests on the basis of a general principle. Such shortcomings were pointed out quite rightly by critics of the utilitarian theory of morality and politics.
Let's see how much they are eliminated in the further development of the individualistic direction on the broad principles proposed by Spencer.