On the question of individual freedom, both he and Montesquieu and Mably understood the freedom of the spoken and printed word, the inviolability of the individual in limited terms. Despite the instructions given by Montesquieu and repeated by Rousseau about the correspondence between freedom, rights and the previous state of the people, Rousseau’s principles in Sopgaf 09a provide the basis for the construction of a democratic republic, in which, according to the author, individual and political freedom are harmonized. Moreover,. political freedom i.e. participation. every citizen in sovereignty 3) (excludes women and dft) is not considered by Rousseau as a means of ensuring individual freedom, but as a goal, as a fundamental principle, without which there are no equal individuals. Even more than that, Rousseau gives some kind of mystical character to the implementation of this freedom. As a result, it turns out
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3) Which (G. I, St. TT) is recognized by Rousseau as “taPepa Me” and “11@1u18 Le”.
-- 355 always indestructible general will ") "Only after the free vote of the people is it discovered that it corresponds to the will of the individual. If the particular sol was mistaken, it remains free only by virtue of its subordination to the general volf. We see that Montesquieu actually discovered in his studies the connection between political freedom and individual freedom, although he distinguished them sharply. However, in the end, he admitted that freedom generally exists only in the minded state, the concept of which he gave according to the type of the English constitution.
Thus, we are faced with two points, the doctrine of political individualism: the idea of the individual and the type of state corresponding to the elements of the concept of the political individual, i.e., his freedom and equality.
In the history of political studies, we say that first the silence of the state is developed, corresponding to political freedom. Then it is already taken into account - this is especially pointed out by Montesquieu - that the state's corresponding political freedoms do not always give place to civil, i.e., individual freedoms: individual freedom could and did exist as an actual, and not a legal, freedom. The constitutions of the ancient republics testify to this. But Montesquieu was the first to show that the actual freedom of a citizen is not durable until it is guaranteed by laws (for which Montesquieu apparently considered civil laws sufficient).
The author of The Spirit of Laws, standing on a historical, i.e., factual basis in his studies, especially on the example of the English constitution, did not clearly indicate the connection between fundamental laws and individual freedom. As we have seen and most understandably individual
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— 356 freedom not only in Montesquieu, but even more so in Rousseau, was limited. But if the specific understanding of freedom in Rousseau (who did not allow unlimited freedom of reliant conscience 1), words and collect, for historical reasons, which he clothed in the terms of his rational system) 2), is limited, then he always puts forward the elements that lie at the core of the concept of the individual 3): the dignity of a free person, his equivalence in comparison with others, freedom and equality in rights, especially the latter, assimilated by the doctrine of the revolutionary %).
From the point of view of that time, Rousseau's specific understanding of individual freedom - to a broader understanding!
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2) But already his students, for example Rabaud Saint-Etienne, are correcting these contradictions.
3) In the spirit of the natural law doctrine.
4) Jellinek in his work, the main idea of which is already found in Weingarten op. syo.—G1e Egypte 4er Menzvep tspa Vigoeggesme. Gehry 1895. $ 11, - to polemicize with R. Fapeyo (ze 4e 1a zaepse rode), who claims that it is necessary to sniffle and goiter! became a source of declaring rights. Refuting it, Jellinek refers to the passage from the “Social Contract”, where Rousseau insists on the alienation of all individual rights in favor of society. Rousseau speaks here of logical, not historical ecom process. Let's say that he was wrong in the logical conclusion, but,